Trump's National Security Strategy

Foreword: As is customary, the President of the United States releases the National Security Strategy Report at the end of the first year of their term, outlining the current government's foreign and security policy ideas. The report has no legal effect and is more akin to guidance. Looking back at history, from the late 19th century to the 1950s, U.S. security strategy was marked by a clear realist color, from declaring the "Monroe Doctrine" to consolidate interests in the Western Hemisphere, to pushing the security line towards the Eurasian continent through two world wars, with the core relying on hard power to expand living space, exhibiting evident unilateralism.

After World War II until the early 21st century, as U.S. power became dominant, the strategy shifted towards liberal internationalism, maintaining global hegemony through the construction of military alliances such as NATO and leading international institutions, while covertly harboring implicit unilateralism—decisively breaking rules that do not align with its own interests. During this period, strategic adjustments were always centered around "maintaining global dominance." However, looking at the strategic reports released by previous administrations, the actual effectiveness has varied. Therefore, can strategy determine behavior? This is a question. During the Cold War, the goal of containing the Soviet Union was clear, with strong bipartisan consensus, and the strategy was relatively thorough, ultimately leading to the dissolution of the Soviet Union;

but after the Cold War, the strategic objectives gradually became vague, and the effectiveness of implementation was greatly reduced. The Bush administration's strategy centered on "counter-terrorism" quickly launched wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, but became mired in long-term turmoil, consuming a large amount of national power; the Obama administration's concept of "rebalancing to Asia" faced limited actual progress due to domestic political struggles and resource dispersion; the Biden administration's 2022 strategic version emphasizes strengthening the ally system to contain China, but fails to address key issues such as burden-sharing among allies and supply chain reconstruction. This indicates that the National Security Strategy, while providing guidance to U.S. government behavior, is not a decisive factor. Domestic party struggles, financial constraints, and ally attitudes all affect the effectiveness of implementation, sometimes even leading to a disconnect between strategy and action. The differences between the Democratic and Republican parties on national security strategy essentially reflect different political goals and interests.

The ideological divide between the two parties extends to foreign strategy:—the Democratic Party is more inclined towards liberal internationalism, advocating for multilateral cooperation, value export, and the establishment of international rules to maintain security, emphasizing global climate governance, human rights, and other issues, believing that U.S. security must be achieved by maintaining a "free international order," backed by the interests of multinational capital and technological elites;—the Republican Party adheres to a conservative base, emphasizing realism, prioritizing domestic interests and economic security, holding a skeptical attitude towards multilateral mechanisms, favoring unilateral actions and power competition, representing the interests of traditional manufacturing and energy industries. This divergence is particularly evident in policies towards China, where the Democratic Party tends to unite allies for systematic containment, while the Republican Party places more importance on direct competition and interest exchange in the economic realm, showing little interest in meaningless ideological confrontations. The new version of the National Security Strategy released by the Trump administration is both a continuation of its "America First" philosophy and a response to the current dilemmas facing the United States.

After returning to office this year, the Trump administration's domestic focus is on revitalizing the economy, promoting reindustrialization, balancing trade, and ensuring key supply chains; diplomatically, it has significantly reduced global obligations, attempting to lighten the burden of overseas intervention. This report is a written strategic expression of the above measures, with the core significance being a farewell to the long-held global hegemony concept, completing a significant shift in strategic focus—from global dominance to the security of the homeland and the Western Hemisphere. Overall, the new strategy's goals are very clear: internally, prioritizing border security, immigration control, and economic security by reducing foreign dependence in critical areas and strengthening domestic industries to solidify the security foundation; externally, reaffirming the "Monroe Doctrine" and proposing the "Trump Corollary," aiming to reshape America's dominant position in the Western Hemisphere while restructuring ally relationships, transforming from "frontline leaders" to "rear motivators," requiring European and Indo-Pacific allies to bear more security costs.

In terms of policy towards China, the goal shifts from "comprehensive containment" to "winning the economic future and preventing military confrontation," defining China as the "primary economic competitor," intending to gain economic benefits through trade negotiations and supply chain restructuring, while also attempting to maintain geographical advantages by strengthening deterrence in the Taiwan Strait to avoid falling into comprehensive military conflict. For example, this 33-page report mentions Taiwan eight times, indicating that this report is not as friendly to China as many perceive. However, regardless of the circumstances, this strategic adjustment will have profound implications for both the United States and China in the coming years. For the United States, in the short term, it may alleviate fiscal pressure, concentrate resources on domestic issues, and measures such as reindustrialization and supply chain repatriation may provide traditional manufacturing industries with a breather;

but in the long term, strategic contraction may weaken its global influence, with loosening relationships with European allies and a diminishing focus on Middle Eastern and African affairs, potentially leading to the disintegration of the traditional ally system, or even triggering geopolitical games in the Western Hemisphere. For China, the risk of direct military confrontation has somewhat decreased, and U.S.-China trade frictions have entered a "ceasefire period," leaving space for economic cooperation, but competition in the economic field will become more intense. The U.S.'s "de-reliance" measures in key minerals, semiconductors, and emerging industries will put pressure on related sectors.

At the same time, the frequent mentions of the Taiwan Strait issue and deterrent statements in the report will still bring uncertainty to regional security, necessitating heightened vigilance. It can be said that this is also the confidence behind Koizumi's refusal to admit mistakes. In summary, the Trump administration's new version of the National Security Strategy is an inevitable choice made by the United States based on its own declining strength and multi-faceted resource constraints, marking the entry of U.S. global strategy into a contraction phase. However, this contraction does not equate to giving up competition, but rather restructures the domains and methods of competition; in the future, U.S.-China relations will evolve within a new framework of "economic competition as the main focus and military deterrence as a supplement," while factors such as domestic party political struggles and the differentiation of the ally system will continue to make the implementation of this strategy full of uncertainties. Therefore, don't think too positively, and don't think too negatively. After all, people are quite familiar with Trump's tactics.