Ravindra Ashit

Bitcoin (BTC) may face a governance and property-rights dilemma well before quantum computers pose a direct technical threat to its cryptography, according to an analysis by Nic Carter, who argues that shortening quantum timelines are colliding with Bitcoin’s historically slow upgrade process. In the second installment of a three-part series on quantum computing and Bitcoin, Carter, who is a partner at Castle Island Ventures, contends that the emergence of a cryptographically relevant quantum computer (CRQC) has shifted from a distant theoretical concern to a time-bound planning problem.

While no such machine exists today, he writes that credible progress across hardware, error correction, government preparedness, and capital investment has reduced the margin for complacency.

The central risk, Carter argues, is not an abrupt cryptographic failure, but the absence of consensus on how Bitcoin should respond if quantum capabilities arrive faster than expected.

Bitcoin’s protocol upgrades have historically taken years to design, debate, and activate, a timeline that may now be misaligned with advances in quantum computing.

Exposed Coins Create A Property-Rights Dilemma

Carter highlights that a significant portion of Bitcoin supply is already vulnerable under a quantum threat model.

Coins held in early pay-to-public-key (p2pk) outputs, legacy formats, Taproot addresses, and reused addresses expose public keys on-chain, making them susceptible to quantum attacks that could reverse-engineer private keys.

He estimates that roughly one-third of all circulating Bitcoin is currently exposed through a combination of legacy address types and address reuse.

This includes approximately 1.7 million BTC from early mining outputs widely believed to be dormant, alongside additional coins held in reused or Taproot addresses.

The presence of these coins creates a dilemma that cannot be resolved purely through software upgrades.

Even if Bitcoin transitions to post-quantum signature schemes, coins already exposed on-chain would remain vulnerable.

Carter argues this forces an uncomfortable choice between allowing potential large-scale theft or intervening at the protocol level in ways that could violate Bitcoin’s long-standing norms around property rights.

Quantum Timelines Draw Government Attention

Carter points to government actions as evidence that quantum risk is no longer being treated as hypothetical.

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Standards bodies such as the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology have laid out timelines to deprecate classical cryptographic systems by 2030 and fully disallow them by 2035.

Similar timelines have emerged independently in the United Kingdom and the European Union.

He also cites programs such as DARPA’s Quantum Benchmarking Initiative, which is explicitly evaluating whether utility-scale quantum computers can be built by the early 2030s.

Public statements from quantum firms and researchers increasingly cluster around the same timeframe, even as expert consensus remains divided on the exact arrival date of a CRQC.

Bitcoin As An Incentive In The Quantum Race

Beyond technical risk, Carter frames Bitcoin as an economic incentive that could accelerate quantum development.

With hundreds of billions of dollars in potentially vulnerable value visible on-chain, Bitcoin represents a tangible prize for any entity capable of exploiting quantum weaknesses, whether state-backed or private.

That dynamic, he argues, raises geopolitical stakes. The first entity to develop a CRQC could gain not only intelligence advantages over encrypted communications, but also leverage over global digital assets infrastructure.

Coordination, Not Code, Seen As The Bottleneck

Carter concludes that Bitcoin’s greatest vulnerability to quantum computing is coordination rather than cryptography.

While post-quantum signatures can be designed and deployed, reaching agreement on how to handle exposed or abandoned coins may prove far more contentious.

He argues that meaningful preparation must begin well ahead of any confirmed quantum breakthrough, given Bitcoin’s slow governance process.

Delaying those discussions risks forcing rushed decisions under crisis conditions, potentially undermining trust in the network.

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