michaelsaylor

On December 16, Michael Saylor shared a characteristically optimistic view on Bitcoin’s future in the age of quantum computing, arguing that the technology will ultimately make Bitcoin stronger rather than destroy it. His statement captures what many consider the best-case scenario for Bitcoin in a post-quantum world:
> “Bitcoin’s quantum leap: Quantum computing will not break Bitcoin — it will harden it. The network will upgrade, active coins will move, lost coins will be frozen. Security increases. Supply decreases. Bitcoin becomes stronger.”
While this vision is directionally appealing, a closer look at the technical, governance, and timing realities reveals a far more complex picture—one where outcomes depend less on cryptography alone and more on coordination, incentives, and execution under pressure.
Quantum Computers Won’t Break Bitcoin — If Migration Happens in Time
At a high level, Saylor’s argument is conceptually correct. Bitcoin’s main vulnerability to quantum computing does not lie in Proof-of-Work, but in its digital signature schemes.
Bitcoin currently relies on ECDSA and Schnorr signatures over the secp256k1 curve. A sufficiently powerful, fault-tolerant quantum computer—equipped with roughly 2,000–4,000 logical qubits—could use Shor’s algorithm to derive private keys from exposed public keys.
Crucially, today’s quantum hardware is still far from this threshold, suggesting that a cryptographically meaningful quantum threat is likely at least a decade away.
On the defensive side, the tools already exist. The U.S. NIST has finalized post-quantum digital signature standards such as ML-DSA (Dilithium) and SLH-DSA (SPHINCS+), with Falcon (FN-DSA) nearing completion. These schemes are quantum-resistant and, in principle, can be integrated into Bitcoin via new output types or hybrid signatures. Recent benchmarks even show that SPHINCS+ could operate in a Bitcoin-like environment.
However, this upgrade comes with real trade-offs. Academic research indicates that moving to post-quantum signatures could reduce effective block capacity by up to 50%, due to much larger signature sizes and heavier verification costs. This would increase node resource requirements and potentially push transaction fees higher.
The most difficult challenge, though, is not technical—it’s governance. Bitcoin has no central authority to mandate upgrades. A post-quantum soft fork would require overwhelming consensus among developers, miners, exchanges, custodians, and large holders—and it must be deployed before quantum computers reach a critical capability. The primary risk is coordination failure and timing, not broken math.
“Lost Coins” Are Not Automatically Frozen
Saylor’s claim that active coins will move while lost coins are frozen is an oversimplification. In reality, quantum risk depends entirely on address type and whether the public key has already been exposed.
Early P2PK outputs embed public keys directly on-chain and are always exposed.
P2PKH and P2WPKH addresses hide the public key behind a hash until the coin is spent; once spent, the public key becomes visible and vulnerable.
Taproot (P2TR) outputs embed the public key from the start, meaning the UTXO is exposed even if it has never moved.
Independent analyses suggest that around 25% of Bitcoin’s total supply currently sits in outputs where the public key is already exposed. This includes large amounts of early-era coins, custodial holdings, and modern Taproot UTXOs.
Notably, Satoshi-era P2PK outputs alone are estimated at roughly 1.7 million BTC, with additional hundreds of thousands of BTC potentially exposed through Taproot.
This means a portion of so-called “lost coins” would not be frozen at all. Instead, they may be ownerless yet stealable, becoming lucrative targets for the first actor with a sufficiently powerful quantum computer.
By contrast, coins whose public keys have never been revealed remain protected by hashing. Grover’s algorithm only provides a quadratic speedup against hashes, a threat that can be mitigated by parameter adjustments.
Supply Does Not Automatically Shrink
The idea that higher security leads to lower supply blurs the line between technical mechanisms and economic speculation.
Technically, post-quantum signatures are viable, and Bitcoin-specific optimizations—such as hybrid outputs or signature aggregation—are actively being researched to limit blockchain bloat.
Economically, however, supply dynamics are anything but automatic. Several scenarios are possible:
1. Vulnerable coins that fail to upgrade become effectively unspendable or socially discouraged.
2. Quantum attackers successfully steal exposed coins, distorting supply and trust.
3. Quantum fear emerges early, triggering sell-offs, governance disputes, or even contentious chain splits.
None of these outcomes guarantees a clean, bullish “supply reduction.” Instead, they could usher in a period of repricing, chaos, and political conflict, with attacks concentrated on legacy wallets.
Conclusion: A Coordination Bet, Not a Cryptography Problem
Physics and standardization roadmaps suggest that quantum computers will not break Bitcoin overnight. The window for a post-quantum transition likely spans a decade or more. But the transition itself is expensive, politically sensitive, and complicated by the fact that a significant portion of Bitcoin’s supply is already exposed.
Saylor is right that Bitcoin can emerge stronger. The network can upgrade its cryptography, harden its defenses, and adapt. But the claim that lost coins will freeze and supply will inevitably shrink only holds if the transition is orderly, widely adopted, and executed before adversaries exploit the lag.
In the end, Bitcoin’s quantum future depends less on qubits and more on coordination. Saylor’s confidence is, ultimately, a bet on the network’s ability to execute a complex, costly, and contentious upgrade before physics catches up.
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