The most dangerous moment for stablecoins is not calm, but panic: everyone simultaneously wants to exchange 'stability' for 'certainty'. USDD 2.0 has a 1:1 exchange window for PSM, but the main problem is very sharp—when everyone rushes toward this door at the same time, will the 1 dollar of USDD first collapse in price, or first collapse in the channel?
The logic of PSM is very clear: it turns 'anchoring' from narrative into arbitrage. When USDD is below 1, buy USDD and then exchange it 1:1 for a more mainstream stablecoin in PSM; when USDD is above 1, exchange mainstream stablecoin 1:1 for USDD to sell it back to the market to press the price down. You may not trust anyone, but you will trust arbitrageurs because arbitrageurs act for profit. The advantage of this mechanism is that it is open, executable, and verifiable.
But this escape route also has its physical limitations: it requires pool depth. The deeper the PSM pool, the better it can absorb short-term selling pressure; the shallower the pool, the easier it is to trigger a chain reaction of 'prices falling first, exports being squeezed.' More realistically, the panic of stablecoins is not linear: when the market begins to doubt 'can it be exchanged out,' the selling pressure will quickly self-reinforce. Therefore, the existence of PSM is not only a mechanism problem but also a confidence structure problem: it must appear sufficient 'usable' at critical moments.
In the structure of USDD 2.0, PSM is not an isolated module; it shares the same safety margin with over-collateralization. Over-collateralization provides 'long-term repayment confidence,' while PSM provides a 'short-term exit channel.' If the collateral buffer is thick enough, the market is less likely to collectively rush towards the exit; if the collateral buffer becomes thinner, PSM will be called upon more frequently, and pool depth pressure will be greater. You will find that this is a mutually reinforcing system: the stronger the confidence, the less congested the exit; the less congested the exit, the stronger the confidence.
So What matters: the discussion of USDD's peg should not only consider 'whether there is PSM,' but should also look at 'whether PSM can still be executable on the worst day.' The peg of stablecoins is not a nail; it is a channel. When the channel is smooth, price fluctuations will be smoothed out by arbitrage; when the channel is congested, price fluctuations will be amplified by emotions. The advantage of USDD is that it has written the channel into the rules, but the rules also need liquidity as fuel.
The risk lies in - PSM as an export will face slippage and price discount diffusion in the secondary market once it is squeezed.
This stems from - short-term exit demand and PSM pool depth being synchronized and amplified at the same moment.
I only focus on one indicator - whether the ratio of PSM available depth to circulating scale remains stable during periods of stress.
What USDD 2.0 wants to achieve is a decentralized dollar base, and the primary principle of the base is not 'sounding stable,' but 'can exit at any time.' Which end do you think stablecoins should strengthen more: widening the PSM entrance or thickening the collateral buffer?
