It is now basically confirmed that Iran's security forces are conducting house-to-house searches and confiscating Starlink terminal devices. It is estimated that around 100,000 Starlink terminals had previously entered Iran through smuggling, which is a considerable scale.
According to Iranian law, possessing or using a Starlink terminal is considered espionage activity on behalf of Israel or the U.S. CIA, with a maximum penalty of 10 years in prison. Therefore, a significant number of Iranian citizens may be affected by this.
Many people might wonder: how has Starlink, a civilian satellite internet service, become viewed by Iran as a 'spy tool'?
First, it's essential to understand where Starlink comes from. Starlink is a project developed by SpaceX, a U.S.-based aerospace company, which publicly claims to provide internet services globally, especially to remote areas not covered by ground-based infrastructure, enabling users to access high-speed internet.
However, despite appearing to be a purely civilian service, Starlink has deep ties with the U.S. government and military. In 2018, the U.S. Department of Defense awarded SpaceX a $150 million contract to develop a military version of Starlink satellites. This military program is still overseen by a former U.S. Air Force general.
Both the U.S. Army and Air Force have collaborated with SpaceX, repeatedly testing Starlink services during military exercises, connecting them to fighter jets, refueling aircraft, and verifying their communication capabilities on the battlefield. In short, while Starlink appears civilian, it has already been deeply integrated into U.S. military operations—a fact Iran is well aware of.
Now consider the tense relationship between Iran and the U.S. and Israel, which has been consistently strained over the years, with frequent conflicts. Israel has carried out multiple attacks on Iran and launched large-scale cyber warfare campaigns aimed at disrupting Iran's critical infrastructure.
Meanwhile, the U.S. has imposed long-term sanctions on Iran, placing both countries in opposition across multiple domains. Just after the recent Iran-Israel conflict ended, a U.S. envoy publicly requested Elon Musk to provide free Starlink access to users within Iran.
From Iran's perspective, Starlink is far from a simple civilian internet tool—it is seen as a means for the U.S. and Israel to infiltrate Iran. Iran fears that if Starlink were widely adopted by its citizens, the U.S. and Israel could use this network to communicate with domestic opposition groups, collect intelligence on Iran, or even guide drones and missiles for attacks—posing a serious threat to Iran's national security.
Another critical point is Starlink's proven military utility in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. After the war began, Ukraine's ground communication infrastructure was quickly destroyed, and Starlink became the primary means of maintaining connectivity. Ukrainian forces used Starlink to control drones for reconnaissance and strike missions, exchanged real-time intelligence with NATO systems, and directed long-range fire against Russian targets.
In some cases, unmanned boats were remotely controlled via Starlink from hundreds of kilometers away to attack Russian warships, achieving notable success. Iran has observed all of this. Starlink’s low-orbit satellites offer wide coverage, signals are difficult to jam, and communication networks can be rapidly established—features that benefit military operations and could also be exploited by spies to transmit intelligence.
Iran fears that its domestic Starlink terminals could be used by the U.S. and Israel to carry out similar actions—such as guiding drones to attack military facilities or collecting sensitive information—so it associates Starlink with espionage.
Additionally, Iran maintains strict control over internet access, having established its own national information network to ensure domestic security and stability. Citizens primarily use this internal network for internet access, with limited access to foreign websites.
Starlink, however, connects directly via satellite, completely bypassing Iran’s network control system. The Iranian government cannot monitor who is using Starlink or what content is being transmitted through it.
To Iran, such an uncontrolled communication tool is highly susceptible to being exploited by external forces to interfere in internal affairs. Especially after past protests, Iran has tightened its internet controls, making Starlink devices—which can circumvent these controls—a top target for prevention.
Some may argue that ordinary citizens only want better internet access and that such strict measures are excessive. But Iran’s concerns stem from national security. A scale of 100,000 terminals is indeed substantial, and if misused by malicious actors, the consequences could be disastrous.
Moreover, Iran’s laws have long made it clear that using unauthorized foreign electronic communication tools—especially those linked to hostile nations—can be deemed espionage, not a sudden policy but a decision based on long-term security conditions and real threats.
Ultimately, Starlink is seen in Iran as a 'spy tool' because of its deep integration with the U.S. military, the prolonged hostility between Iran and the U.S./Israel, Starlink’s demonstrated military potential in war zones, and its ability to bypass Iran’s internet controls.
These factors combined have led Iran to take stringent measures, including house-to-house searches and confiscations. For Iranian citizens, it may simply be about accessing a more stable internet connection. But in the context of complex international tensions and security concerns, Starlink’s presence has transcended its civilian nature, which is why Iran is willing to impose severe penalties to ban it.