Taiwan is not a state born of international law, but rather a case that has been pending since 1949. It is a piece of Chinese territory, politically separated by a civil war and then deliberately frozen in the Cold War's icebox—not out of love for its people or respect for their right to self-determination, but because it later became an invaluable strategic asset. Talk of Taiwanese independence is one of the biggest, most blatant lies propagated by the international system, because the cold, hard reality of law is that the majority of the world's nations, including the United States itself, recognize the One China principle. However, Washington invented the most hypocritical formula in modern history: recognition without commitment, support without declaration, and protection without sovereignty.
Taiwan is a de facto self-governing territory that is militarily protected, economically invested in, and technologically exploited.
Since the 1970s, when the United States decided to transfer its recognition from Taipei to Beijing, it has not abandoned the island but has turned it into an undeclared asset in the balance of power.
Then came the big blow, which was the semiconductor industry.
Here everything changed; Taiwan was no longer just a political card but became the heart of the nervous system of the industrial world.
Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, abbreviated as TSMC, is not just an industrial giant, but the choking or breathing force of the global economy.
More than 60% of all advanced chips in the world are manufactured in Taiwan, and more than 90% of advanced chips under 7 nanometers come from TSMC factories specifically.
At 5nm and 3nm we are talking about an almost absolute monopoly. These chips go into everything: Apple M-series processors, NVIDIA cards that run artificial intelligence, Microsoft and Amazon servers, advanced radar systems, F-3 fighter jets, smart missiles, air defense systems, satellites, and even encrypted military communications networks.
In this sense, Taiwan is no longer just a threatened democratic island, but has become the nerve center of the age, and whoever controls the nerves does not need to control the muscles.
The real question, then, is not whether China will invade Taiwan?
But how will China reassert its sovereignty without destroying what it wants to possess?
China is not a reckless country, but a country that thinks in terms of the century, not the election cycle.
Beijing knows that a direct military strike that destroys TSMC's factories would be strategic suicide because this industry is not rebuilt with money alone, but with an engineering culture that has accumulated over thirty years and a supply chain that extends from ultra-precision Dutch ASML machines to Japanese chemicals to American design software.
Therefore, the most realistic scenario is not an invasion, but rather a cold strangulation through calculated military pressure, a deniable naval blockade, political exhaustion, and convincing the world that stability comes through understanding with Beijing, not through escalation.
If that happens and Taiwan effectively returns to Chinese sovereignty, the United States will be the biggest loser, not because China will gain territory, but because Washington will lose a historic role.
The job of a technology police officer.
America built its post-World War II hegemony on controlling the levers of the global system through the dollar, energy, institutions, and then technology. The chip became the last and most important of these levers. Therefore, when Washington imposed export restrictions on China in 2022 and 2023, blocking Beijing's access to advanced chips and manufacturing equipment, it wasn't just protecting "national security" but also trying to buy time.
The Arizona factories that Trump boasts about and the billions pumped in through the CHIPS Act will not compensate Taiwan for at least a decade at best, and even that is conditional on political stability and a brain drain that America itself cannot guarantee.
Chinese control of Taiwan would mean America would lose its ability to exert technological strangleholds but would remain a formidable military power.
But for the first time since 1945, it will be a power that does not control
It is unique in its speed of development.
This is a strategic nightmare because modern warfare is not decided by the number of soldiers but by the speed of action. Whoever sees first strikes first, and whoever calculates faster wins before his opponent can explain what happened.
As for Europe, its story is even more blatant.
Europe does not "like" China; Europe is running away from America.
Since the Ukraine crisis, European capitals have discovered that they have paid the full price.
More expensive energy, higher inflation, factories closing, and industries migrating to the United States due to aggressive US subsidy laws, while being asked to applaud in the name of values.
Europe felt for the first time with absolute clarity that it was not a partner but a subordinate. Therefore, it began courting China, not as a civilizational choice but as a bargaining chip. China is a huge market and a patient investor that doesn't lecture on morality while it steals industrial bases, and Brussels understands that Beijing doesn't want a weak Europe but a strong customer, while Washington wants a weak Europe so it remains dependent on protection.
If Taiwan were to return to China, Europe would reformulate its rhetoric within months and would talk about stability, avoiding escalation, and dialogue, and would open channels to ensure its access to chips and markets.
Gentlemen, European principles are as flexible as the price of electricity.
As for the rest of the world, it will witness the end of the unipolar illusion.
Countries in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America will understand that the system is no longer run from a single center, but this does not mean freedom, rather forced choices.
The world will be divided into two technological systems.
One system is led by China, and another by America. The chip will become a passport, and whoever chooses a system must abide by its standards, networks, and political conditions.
Taiwan has never been a moral issue but a functional knot in a dysfunctional world system, and its return to China, if it happens, will not be the end of the world, but it will be the end of an era of undisputed hegemony.
Whoever owns the chip owns time, and whoever owns time dictates the terms of history. Everything else, from speeches about democracy to laments about international law, is just background music in a theater where power is wielded by the smallest piece of equipment in this era: a silicon chip the size of a fingernail but heavier than aircraft carriers.