转世轮回
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The principal protection model is where the project side makes a bottom line commitment to the market makers, asking them to help build market liquidity. It’s agreed that any losses from trades will be fully compensated by the project side, while any profits will belong entirely to the market makers. It’s like market makers using tokens or funds provided by the project to conduct market operations, with contracts defining loss compensation rules. Throughout the process, they bear no risk, allowing them to ramp up prices and create fake volume without a second thought. The profit-sharing model, on the other hand, is where the project side and market makers reach a profit-sharing agreement, both agreeing to stabilize or pump up the coin price, ultimately splitting profits at a fixed ratio like 70/30. A common practice is for market makers to acquire tokens at zero cost, pump the price, then sell high and share dividends with the project side. Essentially, it’s a joint effort to control the market and harvest retail investors. These two models need to be strictly prohibited because the principal protection mechanism allows market makers to adopt extreme tactics without hesitation, making fake trades to create false market conditions, deliberately fabricating a short-term high price illusion while completely ignoring real market liquidity. The profit-sharing model, disguised as compliant market-making, manipulates coin prices and breeds a lot of wash trading. Retail investors end up getting harvested under these rules; the trading looks hot, but it’s all just the market makers flipping positions back and forth, creating fake liquidity. Large trades can easily encounter severe slippage and price spikes. After the price is pumped to a high, both market makers and the project side dump their holdings, leaving latecomers stuck deep in losses. Misinformed retail investors can only follow blindly. Once the ban is implemented, the industry will return to normal market-making logic. Market makers will need to bear their own trading risks and rely solely on bid-ask spreads to maintain profits. They must depend on inventory management, risk hedging, and other professional means to control risks and eliminate illegal operations. The project side can no longer outsource market control through principal protection or profit-sharing, and will have to rely on their own fundamentals to attract market capital, bidding farewell to fake liquidity packaging. Meanwhile, the trading environment for retail investors will be significantly purified, the order book market depth will return to a real state, and large capital inflows and outflows will be smoother, effectively reducing slippage. The price trends of cryptocurrencies will genuinely reflect real market supply and demand relationships, free from artificial interference. $币安人生
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土澳大师兄；Telegram 的Founder 度罗夫昨天推特的发言引起轩然大波，他认为从今年年初开始在法国发生的大规模针对Crypto持有者的绑架案是因为法国税务官员卖数据和税务数据库泄露导致的。
不过说实在的如今不到4个月时间里发生了41起，这也太频繁了，平均每个月10+，远远超出其他地区。
持有加密货币的新贵们往往并不会像老钱们的一样给自己带上安保或者拥有巨大的社会影响力或者威慑力，财产也很容易被转移且很难追回，这让Crypto Holders成了香馍馍。
不过说实在的如今不到4个月时间里发生了41起，这也太频繁了，平均每个月10+，远远超出其他地区。
持有加密货币的新贵们往往并不会像老钱们的一样给自己带上安保或者拥有巨大的社会影响力或者威慑力，财产也很容易被转移且很难追回，这让Crypto Holders成了香馍馍。
Kondratiev wave 60-year cycle. Recovery phase 1940s–1950s: Post-WWII reconstruction, early automotive, oil, and electronics industries. Boom phase 1950s–1970s: Cars massively entering households, petrochemicals, aviation, and home appliances exploding, economic golden growth in the US, Europe, and Japan, full employment + mild inflation. Recession phase 1970s–1970s: Oil crisis impact, automotive/heavy industries saturation, stagflation (high inflation + low growth). Depression phase 1980–1985: High interest rates suppressing demand. Recovery phase 1985–1995: Rise of PCs, the internet, and semiconductor industries. Boom phase 1995–2018: Internet/mobile internet explosion, peak globalization. Recession phase 2018–2030: Trade wars, pandemic impact, old tech dividend peaking. Depression phase 2030–2045: Cycle clearing, low-growth oscillation $ETH
Some folks are dropping cash on these so-called lost password Bitcoin wallet files, but these wallet files are bogus. Even if they manage to crack them, there’s no crypto in there. The wallet files are edited by scammers and, once imported, they might show a balance, but that balance only appears locally.
Then there are local collisions with private keys, all prepped with small amounts of crypto, specifically sold as bait. #碰撞 $ETH
Then there are local collisions with private keys, all prepped with small amounts of crypto, specifically sold as bait. #碰撞 $ETH
The thicker the order book depth on centralized exchanges, the harder it is to maneuver. However, on decentralized exchanges, the AMM pools aren't order books; they're governed by an automated market-making formula (x·y=k). This mathematical formula creates a curve of liquidity rather than linear depth. Once you exceed the market-making range, it can lead to slippage with exponential curve changes. This is why, on October 11, 2025, ETH and all those altcoins could drop over 30%. Market makers with large capital just need to push the price outside the market-making zone to make it jump. The liquidity of ETH is mainly distributed in: 1) Centralized markets (Binance, OKX, Coinbase providing spot for BlackRock's ETF). 2) Decentralized markets (Uniswap V3, Curve, Balancer, etc.). 3) Decentralized contract markets. Although this liquidity is enormous, it's actually controlled by a few market-making firms (Jump, Wintermute, Amber, Cumberland). These firms share pricing algorithms, and while DEX liquidity appears decentralized, the main LP ranges in Uniswap V3 are set by the same professional LPs. The reality of ETH is a decentralized facade + centralized execution. The thickness is real, but this thickness can be withdrawn by market makers at any time; the price isn't determined by market consensus. The manipulation methods shift from directly spending effort and money to push prices to making profits by defining volatility ranges. They use derivatives, funding rates, and cross-chain liquidity to define the price zones that are allowed to fluctuate. When they want to ignite volatility, they pull LP from a certain range and penetrate a specific Delta in the derivatives market. A thick pool may sound like a paradox for manipulation, but a thin pool is a chaotic system, while a thick pool is a stable system. Resourceful traders no longer push prices but adjust algorithms. In Uniswap V3, the main LP ranges for ETH/USDC and ETH/DAI are being synchronized upward by several institutions; on the surface, the thick pool strengthens and stabilizes the market. In reality, this operation keeps ETH in a prolonged sideways movement; when the price breaks out, it triggers chain liquidations and LPs automatically sell off. This isn't traditional trading; it's structural harvesting. $ETH
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就在刚刚，大利空来了。中国《金融法》草案刚刚过了为期30天的征求意见期。
如果草案通过，就意味着金融主管部门只要怀疑你“可能”转移资产或者危害国家安全。
就可以冻结查封你的资产，并禁止你出境。
以往这需要有一个刑事程序启动，现在金融监管部门可以直接干了，又能制定法律又能当法官还能查你还有枪。$币安人生
如果草案通过，就意味着金融主管部门只要怀疑你“可能”转移资产或者危害国家安全。
就可以冻结查封你的资产，并禁止你出境。
以往这需要有一个刑事程序启动，现在金融监管部门可以直接干了，又能制定法律又能当法官还能查你还有枪。$币安人生
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土澳；金融法草案：监管部门无需走传统司法程序就能调取 KOL、项目方、OTC 商户的银行流水、微信记录、交易所 API 记录。
🤘🏻冻结、查封资金和证券 —— 行政手段直接动账户,不需要法院判决
🤘🏻限制出境 —— 这一条对加密从业者杀伤力最大。过去”边控”属于刑事强制措施,也就孙哥才有资格享用，现在金融调查阶段就能用，被边控人数估计会有大幅增加。
”不立法就是最好的立法”，加密货币没写详细不是说不管，而是法无可依所以想怎么管都行。
🤘🏻冻结、查封资金和证券 —— 行政手段直接动账户,不需要法院判决
🤘🏻限制出境 —— 这一条对加密从业者杀伤力最大。过去”边控”属于刑事强制措施,也就孙哥才有资格享用，现在金融调查阶段就能用，被边控人数估计会有大幅增加。
”不立法就是最好的立法”，加密货币没写详细不是说不管，而是法无可依所以想怎么管都行。
The cryptocurrency market is full of worthless air tickets, no matter how well they are hyped. After the development of AI, the depth is all fake. Market makers can use backend stop-loss liquidation prices to take advantage of price differences and can withdraw all orders in milliseconds when large funds are buying. When closing a position at 300,000 USDT, they will first incur a loss of over 10%. In this market, exchanges basically always make a profit; project teams almost always make a profit, as they create a large number of worthless air tickets to cash out at TGE; KOLs basically make money through advertising commissions. The big players almost always make money by directly controlling chips, manipulating prices up and down. The only ones left are retail investors, and almost 99% of retail investors will end up losing money on air tickets, while the remaining 1% manage to survive and make a profit. This is not investment at all, but a zero-sum game meticulously designed by structural mathematical probabilities, where winners no longer rely on the poker table for profit. $RAVE
The cars that people are optimistic about are too heavy for the dealer to pull. Even if they do pull, it is just to trap people into taking over, and then it will fall.
$RAVE
$RAVE
Can you randomly piece together words to guess a large Bitcoin wallet? Mnemonic phrase verification mechanism:
The mnemonic phrase is generated from a string of random numbers through an algorithm.
Common lengths are 12, 15, 18, 21, or 24 words.
The mnemonic phrase is not simply "randomly 12 words".
Most of its initial words represent random numbers, and the last few words contain verification information used to validate the correctness of the mnemonic phrase.
For example:
In a 12-word mnemonic phrase, the first 128 bits are random entropy, and the last 4 bits are the check bits extracted from the hash value.
These 4 bits determine the last word through mapping.
Therefore, the last word cannot be arbitrarily chosen.
It is derived from the preceding random entropy through algorithmic calculation, ensuring the overall legality of the mnemonic phrase.
If the user randomly assembles 12 words, the wallet software will prompt "Invalid mnemonic phrase",
because the check bits (i.e., the last few bits of the hash result) do not match.
The purpose of this design:
Prevent input errors (e.g., miswriting a word).
Prevent forging invalid wallets.
Ensure that each mnemonic phrase uniquely corresponds to a specific wallet.
$RAVE
The mnemonic phrase is generated from a string of random numbers through an algorithm.
Common lengths are 12, 15, 18, 21, or 24 words.
The mnemonic phrase is not simply "randomly 12 words".
Most of its initial words represent random numbers, and the last few words contain verification information used to validate the correctness of the mnemonic phrase.
For example:
In a 12-word mnemonic phrase, the first 128 bits are random entropy, and the last 4 bits are the check bits extracted from the hash value.
These 4 bits determine the last word through mapping.
Therefore, the last word cannot be arbitrarily chosen.
It is derived from the preceding random entropy through algorithmic calculation, ensuring the overall legality of the mnemonic phrase.
If the user randomly assembles 12 words, the wallet software will prompt "Invalid mnemonic phrase",
because the check bits (i.e., the last few bits of the hash result) do not match.
The purpose of this design:
Prevent input errors (e.g., miswriting a word).
Prevent forging invalid wallets.
Ensure that each mnemonic phrase uniquely corresponds to a specific wallet.
$RAVE
The Dragon King says that the funding fee for CL in the cryptocurrency market (crude oil perpetual) is driven by the CME futures rollover + index smoothing switch.
The CL index in the cryptocurrency market is anchored to the CME WTI near-month futures. This time: 2605 → 2606 rollover, 5 days of linear switching (20% daily weight) assuming an $8 price difference between 2605 and 2606. Spread over 5 days: the index passively drops by $1.6 per day.
The essence of the funding fee: it is the 'balance fee' that anchors the contract price back to the index, with long and short positions always equal, and the platform does not earn this money.
The index drops passively by $1.6 every day (rollover down). If you short: earn: price drop revenue (≈$1.6/day) pay: funding fee (for example, only $0.5～$1.0/day) → net gain: 1.6 - funding fee. Many people only see 'high funding fee' and do not calculate the revenue from the index drop, thinking that shorting is a loss, but in fact, it is the opposite.
Going long on CME 2606 + shorting Binance CL: - Before Taco on April 8: the price difference between 2605-2606 is stable, rollover revenue > funding fee → blood profit
After Taco: geopolitical sentiment changes sharply, the price difference between near and far months suddenly widens, basis volatility swallows up profits → small loss.
SC2605 (near month): undervalued before the crash. Trump Taco: - SC2605: only drops ~10% (no funding fee)
In the cryptocurrency market, CL: drops ~20%, funding fee is only ~3% → the cryptocurrency market has dropped more, while domestically it is relatively resilient and cheaper.
SC2608 (far month): overvalued. The far month pricing includes more geopolitical risk premium, and the drop should be benchmarked against CME 2608, not the near month.
Only looking at the funding fee numbers, not considering the index drift.
Cannot see the revenue of 'the index naturally drops $1.6 every day', only feeling 'pain from paying'. Thinking that 'positive funding fee = more longs, fewer shorts', but CL is now driven by rollover, not sentiment.
Traditional futures rollover is spontaneous in the market; in the cryptocurrency market, it is a forced 5-day linear roll, and the funding fee is distorted by the mechanism. $CL
The CL index in the cryptocurrency market is anchored to the CME WTI near-month futures. This time: 2605 → 2606 rollover, 5 days of linear switching (20% daily weight) assuming an $8 price difference between 2605 and 2606. Spread over 5 days: the index passively drops by $1.6 per day.
The essence of the funding fee: it is the 'balance fee' that anchors the contract price back to the index, with long and short positions always equal, and the platform does not earn this money.
The index drops passively by $1.6 every day (rollover down). If you short: earn: price drop revenue (≈$1.6/day) pay: funding fee (for example, only $0.5～$1.0/day) → net gain: 1.6 - funding fee. Many people only see 'high funding fee' and do not calculate the revenue from the index drop, thinking that shorting is a loss, but in fact, it is the opposite.
Going long on CME 2606 + shorting Binance CL: - Before Taco on April 8: the price difference between 2605-2606 is stable, rollover revenue > funding fee → blood profit
After Taco: geopolitical sentiment changes sharply, the price difference between near and far months suddenly widens, basis volatility swallows up profits → small loss.
SC2605 (near month): undervalued before the crash. Trump Taco: - SC2605: only drops ~10% (no funding fee)
In the cryptocurrency market, CL: drops ~20%, funding fee is only ~3% → the cryptocurrency market has dropped more, while domestically it is relatively resilient and cheaper.
SC2608 (far month): overvalued. The far month pricing includes more geopolitical risk premium, and the drop should be benchmarked against CME 2608, not the near month.
Only looking at the funding fee numbers, not considering the index drift.
Cannot see the revenue of 'the index naturally drops $1.6 every day', only feeling 'pain from paying'. Thinking that 'positive funding fee = more longs, fewer shorts', but CL is now driven by rollover, not sentiment.
Traditional futures rollover is spontaneous in the market; in the cryptocurrency market, it is a forced 5-day linear roll, and the funding fee is distorted by the mechanism. $CL
Visa/Mastercard is a transaction clearing network that earns through a commission on each payment (ranging from 0.5% to 3%), with a gross margin consistently above 65%. The core of its business is network effects and rule-making authority. They do not touch user funds but act as a 'toll booth' for the movement of funds, ensuring steady income. CRCL is a reserve investment company, with 99% of its 2024 revenue coming from USDC reserve interest (approximately $1.661 billion). The fees from stablecoin issuance/redemption account for less than 5%, while API/payment solutions are about 10%. Users exchange $1 for USDC, and CRCL uses that $1 to buy U.S. Treasury bonds to earn interest, which is essentially interest-free liability arbitrage—user funds that do not pay interest but are utilized to generate income. This is not a 'payment company' but a money market fund manager dressed in the guise of a stablecoin, with a business logic that is worlds apart from Visa/Mastercard. Ordinary users can transfer and transact with USDC almost for free—CRCL cannot charge fees like Visa, otherwise users would flock to USDT and DAI. Only large, fast exchanges incur a small fee, which is so negligible that it cannot support the valuation. If CRCL were to charge fees like Visa, USDC would have long been abandoned by the market, as there are countless free transfer options on the blockchain. The core profit formula for CRCL is: (U.S. Treasury yield - operating costs - commissions) × USDC circulation. In 2024, reserve income will be $1.661 billion, with 55% needing to be shared with Coinbase ($908 million), leaving only 45% for itself; in 2025, the situation worsens with total revenue of $2.747 billion and a net loss of $203 million, with the commission rate rising to 70% and the gross margin falling from 39% to 34%; once the Federal Reserve lowers interest rates and U.S. Treasury yields drop to zero, CRCL's core income will evaporate instantly. It is clearly a fragile business reliant on external factors, betting on the Federal Reserve's 'high interest rate duration', which is completely different from Visa's type of cyclical money-printing machine. Traditional finance has been playing the interest-free liability arbitrage game for hundreds of years, with banks collecting deposits to buy Treasury bonds and insurance companies investing float funds—all following this model, just with CRCL donning a stablecoin disguise. However, banks must pay deposit reserves and are subjected to capital adequacy regulations. Although CRCL is compliant, it must share most of its income with channels like Coinbase $币安人生
The Inside Story of Jesse Livermore
Truth
Wash trading was Livermore's core method for accumulating wealth in the betting houses during his early years, referring to profiting from small price fluctuations through high-frequency, low-spread trading (like buying and selling within seconds). After the SEC was established, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 required all trades to be settled through formal exchanges, leading to the banning of betting houses and the end of wash trading's viability. More importantly, the SEC's oversight of the authenticity of market liquidity (such as requiring traceable transaction records) made it impossible for Livermore to create false price signals through fictitious trades.
Livermore once inflated trading volumes through self-buying and self-selling (matched trades) using related accounts, or colluding with brokers to conduct “wash trades” (one party sells while the other buys, keeping the price unchanged but creating a false impression of trading). The SEC requires all trades to disclose the true beneficiaries and prohibits affecting the market through trades with “non-genuine economic purposes.” This made it impossible for Livermore to conspire to manipulate stock prices through accounts.
Mandatory information disclosure: Publicly traded companies must regularly disclose financial data, rendering Livermore's combination of “insider information + manipulation” ineffective. For example, he once manipulated stock prices by obtaining merger information in advance, but new regulations require that merger information be made public immediately.
The SEC's regulation has shifted the market from manipulation-driven to value-driven. Institutional investors, such as funds, have risen, focusing more on fundamental analysis rather than price manipulation. Livermore can no longer manipulate stock prices. #利弗莫尔 $XAG
Truth
Wash trading was Livermore's core method for accumulating wealth in the betting houses during his early years, referring to profiting from small price fluctuations through high-frequency, low-spread trading (like buying and selling within seconds). After the SEC was established, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 required all trades to be settled through formal exchanges, leading to the banning of betting houses and the end of wash trading's viability. More importantly, the SEC's oversight of the authenticity of market liquidity (such as requiring traceable transaction records) made it impossible for Livermore to create false price signals through fictitious trades.
Livermore once inflated trading volumes through self-buying and self-selling (matched trades) using related accounts, or colluding with brokers to conduct “wash trades” (one party sells while the other buys, keeping the price unchanged but creating a false impression of trading). The SEC requires all trades to disclose the true beneficiaries and prohibits affecting the market through trades with “non-genuine economic purposes.” This made it impossible for Livermore to conspire to manipulate stock prices through accounts.
Mandatory information disclosure: Publicly traded companies must regularly disclose financial data, rendering Livermore's combination of “insider information + manipulation” ineffective. For example, he once manipulated stock prices by obtaining merger information in advance, but new regulations require that merger information be made public immediately.
The SEC's regulation has shifted the market from manipulation-driven to value-driven. Institutional investors, such as funds, have risen, focusing more on fundamental analysis rather than price manipulation. Livermore can no longer manipulate stock prices. #利弗莫尔 $XAG
Big news, just now, the World Gold Council (WGC) jointly released a white paper with BCG, launching the Gold as a Service standard: - Unified custody, auditing, on-chain issuance, and physical redemption throughout the process - Creating an open and shared infrastructure for all digital gold issuers to follow this set - Built-in continuous reconciliation, auditing, and compliance framework, focusing on "trustworthy + interoperability"
In the past, tokenized gold such as PAXG, XAUT, GLD turned "gold on-chain" from a concept into a viable business - WGC is the most authoritative organization in the global gold industry, holding physical gold, vaults, compliance, and institutional channels - Their standards = industry regulations, from now on compliance, institutions, and large funds will only recognize this set - Crypto projects must either adopt WGC standards or be marginalized. The crypto sector wants to use RWA to revolutionize traditional finance, but the result is to enlarge the "digitalization of gold" cake, and then traditional finance takes the compliance and standards to cut the biggest piece.
🧩 The landscape has changed: from "internal competition in the crypto sector" to ecological competition between traditional finance + the crypto sector, WGC holds the discourse power $XAU
In the past, tokenized gold such as PAXG, XAUT, GLD turned "gold on-chain" from a concept into a viable business - WGC is the most authoritative organization in the global gold industry, holding physical gold, vaults, compliance, and institutional channels - Their standards = industry regulations, from now on compliance, institutions, and large funds will only recognize this set - Crypto projects must either adopt WGC standards or be marginalized. The crypto sector wants to use RWA to revolutionize traditional finance, but the result is to enlarge the "digitalization of gold" cake, and then traditional finance takes the compliance and standards to cut the biggest piece.
🧩 The landscape has changed: from "internal competition in the crypto sector" to ecological competition between traditional finance + the crypto sector, WGC holds the discourse power $XAU
$ASTER Everyone stop playing with this coin, it's just to cut leeks, the ones on the exchange are basically all manipulated garbage
The premise of "making money from money" is that you first need to have a sum of startup capital. For example, if your principal is 1000 yuan, even if you work hard to double it, it will only be 2000 yuan. But if your principal is 100 million yuan, a casual return rate of 1% is already 1 million. The so-called snowball effect must ensure that it originally is a snowball, and that it rolls bigger on a long enough snowy path. It cannot just be a snow particle, and you naively wish to roll the snow particle into a snowball. Usually, the situation is that the snow particle cannot roll for long before losing its potential energy and stops, turning into a puddle of water, because you cannot guarantee that there are no small stones or pits blocking your way on this path. (Turn) $SPK
Bitcoin's underlying architecture has become rigid, hard forks = splits, and the community has long resisted major upgrades. Quantum-resistant signatures (such as Dilithium/Falcon) are incompatible with the existing UTXO model, almost requiring a 'rewrite of the foundation'. The historical baggage is the heaviest: Satoshi Nakamoto's address, early whales, and the mining ecosystem all oppose drastic changes. The value narrative is the most fragile (almost doomed), Bitcoin's core narrative: digital gold, absolute security, immutability, and permanent value retention. However, quantum breakthroughs = the complete collapse of the security narrative, institutions/whales will instantly liquidate, and liquidity will drop to zero.
Meanwhile, ETH is already working on a quantum-resistant roadmap; account abstraction + EIP upgrades can facilitate smooth migration. SOL/ADA: more modern architecture, faster upgrade speed, and a more flexible community
$XMR
Meanwhile, ETH is already working on a quantum-resistant roadmap; account abstraction + EIP upgrades can facilitate smooth migration. SOL/ADA: more modern architecture, faster upgrade speed, and a more flexible community
$XMR
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