If we say that Xu Jiayin had only one chance to turn things around, it would be when he was making Evergrande Spring.

Because Evergrande Spring has no upper limit, it's normal to earn hundreds of billions in a year. The owner of Nongfu Spring, Zhong Shanshan, surpassed Jack Ma in wealth by selling water, although Hainan's Haikou Flower Island also has no upper limit, but after all, Haikou Flower Island is just a tourist attraction.

In South China, I was notified to attend an order meeting for a water brand. The venue was brightly lit, with a whole row of sample waters displayed, the packaging was good, and the taste was acceptable. The person in charge patted his chest and said they wanted to make the water a new explosive product, spreading it to every street. The PPT stated nationwide coverage, media placement, and celebrity endorsements. It sounded uplifting.

When the real terms came out, everyone started to look at each other. The initial order quantity was high, and the entrance fee had to be calculated separately, with display placement requiring a stack. The suggested retail price headed straight for the high-end, not in the same range as the two yuan water in community stores. The old distributor next to me whispered that at this price point, it's hard to sell in volume.

The launch did indeed have a grand momentum. Advertisements were everywhere, and convenience stores changed their displays overnight. The first week's sales were good, but problems arose in the second week. Supermarkets held promotions and pulled the price down to over three yuan, while street-side small shops were still selling for over four yuan. Once the price difference appeared, parallel trading began, and someone reported low prices in various groups. County distributors occasionally held back several trucks of inventory, and cash flow became tight.

The most agonizing moment was at eleven o'clock one night when the regional group notified that the guiding price would be uniformly lowered the next morning, and old price inventory would have to be digested on its own. The group was quiet at first, then exploded; some said that at this pace, old customers would run away, some asked how rebates were calculated, and some directly said they wanted to exit. The next day I went to the warehouse, and the goods were piled up like a wall, with the driver smoking at the door, saying that if he took it back, the boss would be furious.

In fact, for the water category, the biggest fear is not the competitors, but consumers unwilling to spend a few yuan every day. You either tell a water source story that everyone can remember, or provide a price that people won't hesitate to pay, or leave enough profit for the channels. If you cover one of the three, you can survive; cover two, you can grow big. In our case, we wanted to cover all three, but ended up not standing firm on any.

Later, the headquarters pushed out new packaging and new pricing, trying to move into high-end gift boxes while also focusing on the sinking market. Wanting both ends, the channels became more hesitant. Everyone was afraid of changing prices, afraid of pressure on inventory, afraid that there would be new policies tomorrow. The brand hadn't solidified in consumers' minds yet, and the channels' patience was exhausted first.

Now, looking back, if we had stabilized prices and sales from several core cities at that time, without rushing to cast a net nationwide, giving distributors lighter tasks and clearer profit structures, even if it was slower, we might have found a second path. After all, water isn't a one-time purchase; it relies on daily repurchases.

That night, the breeze at the warehouse entrance was very cool. I watched the last truck of returned water get loaded up, and my phone was still lighting up with group messages. Someone was asking if they could try again after the price drop. More people were silent. Did you buy that bottle of water back then? How much are you willing to pay for a bottle of water?