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恒生和a50走势劈叉 谁对谁错
恒生和a50走势劈叉
谁对谁错
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Zhejiang Gold Center has exploded, and the ones trapped are all middle-class, with the least investing several million! Many people are puzzled, do they really care about this 5% interest? Now the lobby of the Zhejiang Gold Center is crowded with investors from all over the country demanding an explanation, and it is impossible to withdraw funds from the Zhejiang Gold APP.
Zhejiang Gold Center has exploded, and the ones trapped are all middle-class, with the least investing several million!
Many people are puzzled, do they really care about this 5% interest?
Now the lobby of the Zhejiang Gold Center is crowded with investors from all over the country demanding an explanation, and it is impossible to withdraw funds from the Zhejiang Gold APP.
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Passenger Car Association: The trend of hollowing out profits in the automotive industry is very severe, with significant upstream profit interception. The Passenger Car Association stated that the trend of hollowing out profits in the automotive industry is very severe, and upstream profit interception is serious. Various regions are vigorously promoting the implementation of the "Two New" policies, effectively releasing the vitality of domestic demand, and the effects of the policy to replace old consumer goods with new ones are evident. However, the improvement in the automotive industry's profitability is significantly lagging behind other consumer goods. As the national efforts to combat involution continue to advance, the profit margin in the non-ferrous metal mining and selection industry exceeds 30%, the profits in the upstream steel industry have greatly improved, the battery industry is highly profitable, and the high costs associated with intelligent driving have led to a contraction in the profits of the automotive industry while upstream enterprises in the industrial chain are performing well.
Passenger Car Association: The trend of hollowing out profits in the automotive industry is very severe, with significant upstream profit interception. The Passenger Car Association stated that the trend of hollowing out profits in the automotive industry is very severe, and upstream profit interception is serious. Various regions are vigorously promoting the implementation of the "Two New" policies, effectively releasing the vitality of domestic demand, and the effects of the policy to replace old consumer goods with new ones are evident. However, the improvement in the automotive industry's profitability is significantly lagging behind other consumer goods. As the national efforts to combat involution continue to advance, the profit margin in the non-ferrous metal mining and selection industry exceeds 30%, the profits in the upstream steel industry have greatly improved, the battery industry is highly profitable, and the high costs associated with intelligent driving have led to a contraction in the profits of the automotive industry while upstream enterprises in the industrial chain are performing well.
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国家税务总局:严禁平台企业向各类“小哥”等人员转嫁涉税义务增加其负担
国家税务总局:严禁平台企业向各类“小哥”等人员转嫁涉税义务增加其负担
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Honestly, air conditioning companies can't afford copper now Photovoltaics can't afford silver They should have replaced a lot with aluminum Quality is hard to say Maybe second-hand is better than new quality.
Honestly, air conditioning companies can't afford copper now
Photovoltaics can't afford silver
They should have replaced a lot with aluminum
Quality is hard to say
Maybe second-hand is better than new quality.
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Hangzhou Normal University details have come out Watercolor pens 288 a set Books 8000 a set Building blocks 700 a set Is it gold-plated?
Hangzhou Normal University details have come out
Watercolor pens 288 a set Books 8000 a set Building blocks 700 a set
Is it gold-plated?
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It is understandable that Lenovo is moving its manufacturing department to India, after all, the costs are lower there, but moving the core R&D department from Shanghai to India is something many people may find difficult to understand. I have a classmate at Lenovo's Shanghai R&D, who received a notification after the Spring Festival that the team would be split, with some members going to Bangalore for long-term assignments; he is on the list. His child just started kindergarten, and he didn't sleep a wink that night, repeatedly checking the project schedule. Unable to harden his heart, he made a request: to go for a three-month trial. Upon arrival, his first impression was that there were many smart people who wrote code quickly, but the equipment was slow to arrive, and they couldn't get in touch with supporting manufacturers, often getting stuck in meetings over a small component. The most pressing time was during client acceptance, when the chips needed for debugging were delayed; he broke down the domestic plan into a checklist, connected via video overnight, and temporarily modified the test platform into two processes, managing to keep the project on track. After returning home, he told me that the difficulty was not in technology, but in processes and collaboration, and that creating standards for these would enable operations anywhere. He also saw opportunities. The communication costs with Indian clients are low, the market is willing to try new things, and while they are price-sensitive, the volume is large. The subsidies and rotation policies offered by the company are decent; the key is whether you are willing to broaden your horizons. Many people worry about "core leakage"; he said it is actually more akin to modular division of labor, with the underlying direction remaining in China, while adaptation and localization are done externally, where risks are controllable, but it requires people to oversee it. I asked him a question: Are you afraid that all positions will be overseas in the future? He said not to be afraid; what is scary is if we only want to stay in our comfort zone. Corporate globalization is not a retreat; it is an extension. Whoever can replicate the efficiency and engineering capabilities of the Chinese team abroad will capture new markets. We used to talk about Chinese manufacturing; now we should talk about Chinese people going global for manufacturing and R&D. This changed my mindset. Rather than arguing online, it is better to focus on three points: Can talent collaborate across cultures? Can the supply chain be quickly rebuilt? Is intellectual property and core capability managed in layers? If we do these three things well, it will enhance the company's global presence. If we fail to do well, even the cheapest costs can turn into invisible losses. You may still be unaccustomed to this change, but the market does not wait for anyone. When orders and resources begin to flow globally, we must learn to win in different coordinate systems. Perhaps the next time you see a new product launch, the team will be seamlessly switching between Shanghai and Bangalore. The suspense lies here: whoever can manage a hybrid team smoothly will take the lead in the future.
It is understandable that Lenovo is moving its manufacturing department to India, after all, the costs are lower there, but moving the core R&D department from Shanghai to India is something many people may find difficult to understand.
I have a classmate at Lenovo's Shanghai R&D, who received a notification after the Spring Festival that the team would be split, with some members going to Bangalore for long-term assignments; he is on the list. His child just started kindergarten, and he didn't sleep a wink that night, repeatedly checking the project schedule. Unable to harden his heart, he made a request: to go for a three-month trial. Upon arrival, his first impression was that there were many smart people who wrote code quickly, but the equipment was slow to arrive, and they couldn't get in touch with supporting manufacturers, often getting stuck in meetings over a small component. The most pressing time was during client acceptance, when the chips needed for debugging were delayed; he broke down the domestic plan into a checklist, connected via video overnight, and temporarily modified the test platform into two processes, managing to keep the project on track. After returning home, he told me that the difficulty was not in technology, but in processes and collaboration, and that creating standards for these would enable operations anywhere.
He also saw opportunities. The communication costs with Indian clients are low, the market is willing to try new things, and while they are price-sensitive, the volume is large. The subsidies and rotation policies offered by the company are decent; the key is whether you are willing to broaden your horizons. Many people worry about "core leakage"; he said it is actually more akin to modular division of labor, with the underlying direction remaining in China, while adaptation and localization are done externally, where risks are controllable, but it requires people to oversee it.
I asked him a question: Are you afraid that all positions will be overseas in the future? He said not to be afraid; what is scary is if we only want to stay in our comfort zone. Corporate globalization is not a retreat; it is an extension. Whoever can replicate the efficiency and engineering capabilities of the Chinese team abroad will capture new markets. We used to talk about Chinese manufacturing; now we should talk about Chinese people going global for manufacturing and R&D.
This changed my mindset. Rather than arguing online, it is better to focus on three points: Can talent collaborate across cultures? Can the supply chain be quickly rebuilt? Is intellectual property and core capability managed in layers? If we do these three things well, it will enhance the company's global presence. If we fail to do well, even the cheapest costs can turn into invisible losses.
You may still be unaccustomed to this change, but the market does not wait for anyone. When orders and resources begin to flow globally, we must learn to win in different coordinate systems. Perhaps the next time you see a new product launch, the team will be seamlessly switching between Shanghai and Bangalore. The suspense lies here: whoever can manage a hybrid team smoothly will take the lead in the future.
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The night before the decisive battle is bound to be thrilling! Various stockpiled armored vehicles and artillery from the West have been sent to Ukraine. The Ukrainian Ministry of Education has directly expelled 50,000 male university students, who will all be mobilized to serve in the military. The Ukrainian State Quality Supervision Bureau stated that universities and colleges have become shelters for those evading conscription by the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The Ukrainian side has already expelled the first batch of 50,000 male university students over the age of 25. In Ukraine, the conscription age is 25. These students have used deferred graduation to obtain student status. Once they reach over 25, they still cannot graduate. This is to evade military service. Now, on the night before the decisive battle, the Ukrainian side is carrying out the final mobilization. On the other side, countries like Italy, Sweden, Finland, and Germany have also begun to urgently transport the last stock of decommissioned armored vehicles to Ukraine to bolster the strength of the Ukrainian army. The United States demands that Europe must begin to take on most of NATO's defense tasks by 2027. Intelligence, operational transport, missile defense, drones, cyber warfare, and ammunition supply, all must be fully the responsibility of Europe. The U.S. military is pulling out; if you want to fight, you Europeans go and fight yourselves! From the European perspective, the Russian army is expected to take action in 2030. NATO plans to be combat-ready by 2030. Therefore, during this period, Ukraine needs to hold the frontline to buy time for Europe to rearm.
The night before the decisive battle is bound to be thrilling! Various stockpiled armored vehicles and artillery from the West have been sent to Ukraine. The Ukrainian Ministry of Education has directly expelled 50,000 male university students, who will all be mobilized to serve in the military.
The Ukrainian State Quality Supervision Bureau stated that universities and colleges have become shelters for those evading conscription by the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The Ukrainian side has already expelled the first batch of 50,000 male university students over the age of 25.
In Ukraine, the conscription age is 25. These students have used deferred graduation to obtain student status. Once they reach over 25, they still cannot graduate. This is to evade military service. Now, on the night before the decisive battle, the Ukrainian side is carrying out the final mobilization.
On the other side, countries like Italy, Sweden, Finland, and Germany have also begun to urgently transport the last stock of decommissioned armored vehicles to Ukraine to bolster the strength of the Ukrainian army.
The United States demands that Europe must begin to take on most of NATO's defense tasks by 2027. Intelligence, operational transport, missile defense, drones, cyber warfare, and ammunition supply, all must be fully the responsibility of Europe. The U.S. military is pulling out; if you want to fight, you Europeans go and fight yourselves!
From the European perspective, the Russian army is expected to take action in 2030. NATO plans to be combat-ready by 2030. Therefore, during this period, Ukraine needs to hold the frontline to buy time for Europe to rearm.
See original
In the winter of 1937, Peng Dehuai, the deputy commander of the Eighth Route Army, was worried as he looked at the accounts — the supplies captured from the victory at Pingxingguan were only enough to last three months, while the Japanese army was implementing the "Three Alls Policy" in the base areas, and the Kuomintang was strictly blockading the economy. How to feed an increasing number of troops? This problem was more headache-inducing than fighting. The battle at Pingxingguan was fought decisively, with the 115th Division annihilating over a thousand Japanese troops, capturing over a thousand rifles, dozens of machine guns, hundreds of trucks, and mountains of canned food, flour, and overcoats. But as soon as the battle was over, it was time to tally the accounts: the three divisions of the Eighth Route Army added up to only thirty thousand men, but in less than two months, it swelled to over a hundred thousand, with wounded soldiers, local officials, and guerrilla fighters all needing to be fed. The little captured supplies, when divided among everyone, couldn't even last three months. What's worse is that starting from early 1938, the Japanese military carried out the "Three Alls" policy in North China, burning villages, looting grain, and killing all humans and livestock, sweeping through the Jin-Cha-Ji, Jin-Sui, and Shandong base areas. The Kuomintang was also busy, with Yan Xishan and Wei Lihuang's troops building one blockade and bunker after another, preventing salt, cloth, and medicine from coming in; even matches became a luxury. At this time, could we still expect funding from above? It was absolutely hopeless. The Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia border region government had a fiscal revenue of only more than 7 million yuan in 1940, and after the Kuomintang stopped paying the Eighth Route Army's military salaries, even this little money was about to run out. Later, Peng Dehuai recalled that in those years, the most worrying thing was not fighting, but eating. The only solution was to think for ourselves. First, save from the people's bowls. From the end of 1937 to 1938, various base areas successively implemented rent reduction and interest reduction, with rent generally dropping to below 37.5% of the harvest, and usury interest cut to below 1.5%. An ordinary tenant farmer in Junan, Shandong could save three to four shi of grain in a year, and some villages in Jin-Cha-Ji directly refunded the excess rent to farmers. The enlightened gentleman Liu Shaobai donated 300 shi of millet at once, and many small and medium landlords followed suit, donating grain and cloth, which was better than having the Japanese come and ruin the whole family. The savings were still not enough, so the troops had to farm for themselves. In March 1941, 7,000 men from the 359th Brigade moved into Nanniwan, and over three years turned barren mountains into granaries, delivering up to 1 million jin of grain in a year. By 1944, the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia border region had cultivated 2.6 million mu of land, achieving a grain self-sufficiency rate of 100%. The same was true in the Taihang Mountains, Jin-Sui, and Shandong, where troops farmed while fighting, making the Eighth Route Army truly a "combat team and production team" without neglecting either. Weapons and ammunition had to be made by themselves. The Taihang Mountain arsenal dragged back the iron rails blown apart by the Japanese army for re-smelting, producing 11,000 rifles and 300,000 grenades in 1944 alone. Without a lathe, they used hemp ropes to manually scrape gun chambers, grinding until their hands bled. Clothing factories, shoe factories, and pharmaceutical factories all got involved, and the "Guanghua" brand quinine produced in Yan'an saved countless soldiers fighting in the front lines. The blockade line was not impenetrable. The border region trade bureau secretly transported tungsten sand, tung oil, and pig bristles out to exchange for silver dollars, medicines, and machine tools. From 1938 to 1941, just tungsten sand alone exchanged for over 6 million silver dollars. Overseas Chinese were even more hardcore, donating the equivalent of 1.3 billion yuan in national currency during the eight years of the war, with Chen Jiageng alone donating several hundred million. By the time of the victory in 1945, the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army had already reached 1.27 million people, with nearly 100 million people in the liberated areas, self-sufficient in grain, weapons, and clothing. During the Huaihai Campaign, the 600,000 troops were fed and equipped, supported by 5.43 million laborers pushing them out with handcarts, with Northeast farmers averaging 150 jin of grain tax, and no one could hide from it; landlords were all eager to pay more. To sum it up in one sentence: whoever allows the common people to live a good life, the common people will entrust their lives to them. The Eighth Route Army's few broken guns and cannons, able to grow from thirty thousand to a million strong, relied not on falling pies from the sky, but on the scale in the hearts of hundreds of millions of people.
In the winter of 1937, Peng Dehuai, the deputy commander of the Eighth Route Army, was worried as he looked at the accounts — the supplies captured from the victory at Pingxingguan were only enough to last three months, while the Japanese army was implementing the "Three Alls Policy" in the base areas, and the Kuomintang was strictly blockading the economy. How to feed an increasing number of troops? This problem was more headache-inducing than fighting.
The battle at Pingxingguan was fought decisively, with the 115th Division annihilating over a thousand Japanese troops, capturing over a thousand rifles, dozens of machine guns, hundreds of trucks, and mountains of canned food, flour, and overcoats. But as soon as the battle was over, it was time to tally the accounts: the three divisions of the Eighth Route Army added up to only thirty thousand men, but in less than two months, it swelled to over a hundred thousand, with wounded soldiers, local officials, and guerrilla fighters all needing to be fed. The little captured supplies, when divided among everyone, couldn't even last three months.
What's worse is that starting from early 1938, the Japanese military carried out the "Three Alls" policy in North China, burning villages, looting grain, and killing all humans and livestock, sweeping through the Jin-Cha-Ji, Jin-Sui, and Shandong base areas. The Kuomintang was also busy, with Yan Xishan and Wei Lihuang's troops building one blockade and bunker after another, preventing salt, cloth, and medicine from coming in; even matches became a luxury.
At this time, could we still expect funding from above? It was absolutely hopeless. The Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia border region government had a fiscal revenue of only more than 7 million yuan in 1940, and after the Kuomintang stopped paying the Eighth Route Army's military salaries, even this little money was about to run out. Later, Peng Dehuai recalled that in those years, the most worrying thing was not fighting, but eating.
The only solution was to think for ourselves.
First, save from the people's bowls. From the end of 1937 to 1938, various base areas successively implemented rent reduction and interest reduction, with rent generally dropping to below 37.5% of the harvest, and usury interest cut to below 1.5%. An ordinary tenant farmer in Junan, Shandong could save three to four shi of grain in a year, and some villages in Jin-Cha-Ji directly refunded the excess rent to farmers. The enlightened gentleman Liu Shaobai donated 300 shi of millet at once, and many small and medium landlords followed suit, donating grain and cloth, which was better than having the Japanese come and ruin the whole family.
The savings were still not enough, so the troops had to farm for themselves. In March 1941, 7,000 men from the 359th Brigade moved into Nanniwan, and over three years turned barren mountains into granaries, delivering up to 1 million jin of grain in a year. By 1944, the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia border region had cultivated 2.6 million mu of land, achieving a grain self-sufficiency rate of 100%. The same was true in the Taihang Mountains, Jin-Sui, and Shandong, where troops farmed while fighting, making the Eighth Route Army truly a "combat team and production team" without neglecting either.
Weapons and ammunition had to be made by themselves. The Taihang Mountain arsenal dragged back the iron rails blown apart by the Japanese army for re-smelting, producing 11,000 rifles and 300,000 grenades in 1944 alone. Without a lathe, they used hemp ropes to manually scrape gun chambers, grinding until their hands bled. Clothing factories, shoe factories, and pharmaceutical factories all got involved, and the "Guanghua" brand quinine produced in Yan'an saved countless soldiers fighting in the front lines.
The blockade line was not impenetrable. The border region trade bureau secretly transported tungsten sand, tung oil, and pig bristles out to exchange for silver dollars, medicines, and machine tools. From 1938 to 1941, just tungsten sand alone exchanged for over 6 million silver dollars. Overseas Chinese were even more hardcore, donating the equivalent of 1.3 billion yuan in national currency during the eight years of the war, with Chen Jiageng alone donating several hundred million.
By the time of the victory in 1945, the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army had already reached 1.27 million people, with nearly 100 million people in the liberated areas, self-sufficient in grain, weapons, and clothing. During the Huaihai Campaign, the 600,000 troops were fed and equipped, supported by 5.43 million laborers pushing them out with handcarts, with Northeast farmers averaging 150 jin of grain tax, and no one could hide from it; landlords were all eager to pay more.
To sum it up in one sentence: whoever allows the common people to live a good life, the common people will entrust their lives to them. The Eighth Route Army's few broken guns and cannons, able to grow from thirty thousand to a million strong, relied not on falling pies from the sky, but on the scale in the hearts of hundreds of millions of people.
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Today it was learned from the market that Moutai has pressed over 20 billion Feitian to national agents this month, with a price of 1500 yuan. Some agents have indicated that the price will definitely not hold, and they will sell at market price as soon as the goods arrive; the sooner they sell, the less they will lose. In Zhengzhou's Bai Rong market, a major player with annual sales of several billion, there are no more than 10 pieces of Moutai in the store, indicating that the channel has a very poor expectation for the future. It is predicted that around 1400 before and after the Spring Festival, and by the first half of next year, at the latest by National Day, 1200.
Today it was learned from the market that Moutai has pressed over 20 billion Feitian to national agents this month, with a price of 1500 yuan. Some agents have indicated that the price will definitely not hold, and they will sell at market price as soon as the goods arrive; the sooner they sell, the less they will lose. In Zhengzhou's Bai Rong market, a major player with annual sales of several billion, there are no more than 10 pieces of Moutai in the store, indicating that the channel has a very poor expectation for the future. It is predicted that around 1400 before and after the Spring Festival, and by the first half of next year, at the latest by National Day, 1200.
See original
On graduation day, the performance class WeChat group suddenly fell silent. The excitement of receiving the diploma was still fresh but quickly faded. It turned out that the admission letter was not a ticket to enter, just an experience card. I know a junior sister who went for an audition last week. When she arrived at the venue, it was crowded with familiar faces. Not just seniors from the same school, but also 'competitors' from neighboring institutions. The hallway was packed with people, all looking sharp and full of determination in their eyes. The assistant director held the list, not looking up: 'Next.' She had prepared a segment for three months, but they only gave her thirty seconds. Walking out of the building, she sent me a voice message, her tone light: 'Sister, I feel like a cabbage, waiting to be picked and chosen.' This industry, it's no longer as simple as 'if you're gold, you'll shine'. According to last year's report from Beijing Film Academy, the signing rate for the drama department was just over 37%. What does that mean? More than half of the graduates from prestigious schools are 'unemployed' right after graduation. It's not that they lack ability, it's that there aren't places for them to perform. I used to think that getting into a prestigious school meant you were half-way into the industry. Now I realize, you may have entered, but inside is a maze. Skill is the stepping stone, but which door you can open depends on who hands you the stone. These days, people are talking about 'competition'. In this circle, competing in acting is just basic; what really matters is emotional intelligence, connections, and the resources behind you. Look at the leading roles in those big productions every year, 70% have major companies or 'benefactors' backing them. When the lights shine and the camera is on you, you think it's all about lines and tears. But off-camera, it's a competition of whose investors are stronger and whose management team is more capable. It's quite cruel, isn't it? But this is reality. So now many kids and parents need to think clearly. Spending hundreds of thousands and sacrificing four precious years to gamble on a future, is it worth it? It's not that you shouldn't chase your dreams, but you need to chase them with awareness. Fortunately, the times have opened up some new gaps. Short videos, short plays, niche web dramas have become practice grounds for many newcomers. Although they are still far from 'being popular', at least there are places to hone skills and be seen. To be frank: This industry is like a high-stakes gamble. Talent is your capital, hard work is the bet, but what hand you end up with depends on who is sitting across from you and the dealer's luck. Do you think kids without wealthy backgrounds should still strive to squeeze into this path?
On graduation day, the performance class WeChat group suddenly fell silent.
The excitement of receiving the diploma was still fresh but quickly faded.
It turned out that the admission letter was not a ticket to enter, just an experience card.
I know a junior sister who went for an audition last week.
When she arrived at the venue, it was crowded with familiar faces.
Not just seniors from the same school, but also 'competitors' from neighboring institutions.
The hallway was packed with people, all looking sharp and full of determination in their eyes.
The assistant director held the list, not looking up: 'Next.'
She had prepared a segment for three months, but they only gave her thirty seconds.
Walking out of the building, she sent me a voice message, her tone light: 'Sister, I feel like a cabbage, waiting to be picked and chosen.'
This industry, it's no longer as simple as 'if you're gold, you'll shine'.
According to last year's report from Beijing Film Academy, the signing rate for the drama department was just over 37%.
What does that mean?
More than half of the graduates from prestigious schools are 'unemployed' right after graduation.
It's not that they lack ability, it's that there aren't places for them to perform.
I used to think that getting into a prestigious school meant you were half-way into the industry.
Now I realize, you may have entered, but inside is a maze.
Skill is the stepping stone, but which door you can open depends on who hands you the stone.
These days, people are talking about 'competition'.
In this circle, competing in acting is just basic; what really matters is emotional intelligence, connections, and the resources behind you.
Look at the leading roles in those big productions every year, 70% have major companies or 'benefactors' backing them.
When the lights shine and the camera is on you, you think it's all about lines and tears.
But off-camera, it's a competition of whose investors are stronger and whose management team is more capable.
It's quite cruel, isn't it?
But this is reality.
So now many kids and parents need to think clearly.
Spending hundreds of thousands and sacrificing four precious years to gamble on a future, is it worth it?
It's not that you shouldn't chase your dreams, but you need to chase them with awareness.
Fortunately, the times have opened up some new gaps.
Short videos, short plays, niche web dramas have become practice grounds for many newcomers.
Although they are still far from 'being popular', at least there are places to hone skills and be seen.
To be frank:
This industry is like a high-stakes gamble.
Talent is your capital, hard work is the bet, but what hand you end up with depends on who is sitting across from you and the dealer's luck.
Do you think kids without wealthy backgrounds should still strive to squeeze into this path?
See original
The people at the gold store are now confused. It's not that no one is buying at high prices, but rather that young people are not following conventional rules. Normally, purchasing gold jewelry would require going to a gold store, but many young people do not recognize brands like Zhou Dasheng or Zhou Shengsheng. Instead, they are going to banks to buy gold bars and then have craftsmen create their jewelry. As a result, after deducting the craftsman's labor fee, gold jewelry of the same weight is often much cheaper than buying from a gold store. This is because, inherently, the brand recognition for such items is not very high. Experienced craftsmen can create almost any basic design, and the main considerations are purity and weight rather than brand premiums. On the contrary, gold store brand premiums are still quite significant, and young people naturally are unwilling to pay for them. One feeling is that contemporary young people are truly remarkable. The main reasons many markets, such as those for liquor, cigarettes, collectibles, and housing, are struggling is because young people are either not participating or are changing the game. Therefore, many traditional methods in various industries cannot continue to be sustained.
The people at the gold store are now confused. It's not that no one is buying at high prices, but rather that young people are not following conventional rules. Normally, purchasing gold jewelry would require going to a gold store, but many young people do not recognize brands like Zhou Dasheng or Zhou Shengsheng. Instead, they are going to banks to buy gold bars and then have craftsmen create their jewelry.
As a result, after deducting the craftsman's labor fee, gold jewelry of the same weight is often much cheaper than buying from a gold store. This is because, inherently, the brand recognition for such items is not very high. Experienced craftsmen can create almost any basic design, and the main considerations are purity and weight rather than brand premiums. On the contrary, gold store brand premiums are still quite significant, and young people naturally are unwilling to pay for them.
One feeling is that contemporary young people are truly remarkable. The main reasons many markets, such as those for liquor, cigarettes, collectibles, and housing, are struggling is because young people are either not participating or are changing the game. Therefore, many traditional methods in various industries cannot continue to be sustained.
See original
Asia's Lithium City Mining Crisis: CATL's Lithium Mine Resumption Falls Through, Traders Have No Ore to Sell Lao Zhou has been in the lithium ore business in Yifeng for five years, and this winter has left him stunned. On December 5, he went to the warehouse to check and found that even the last truckload of goods was missing. Holding a price list of 400 yuan per ton, no one was willing to sell. Last year at this time, his warehouse still had 30,000 tons of ore stacked up; this year, even samples are nowhere to be found. It’s not just Lao Zhou experiencing this situation; 90% of small traders in Yichun are stuck here, and everyone wants to know where the goods went. The answer points to the same place—Jianxiawo. That place was supposed to resume operations on December 5, but there was not a sound on site, as if no one had ever been there. The machines were not operating, and no workers were seen. It wasn't due to equipment failure but because the law changed. CATL spent over 800 million three years ago to acquire the exploration rights for this land, which was registered as ceramic clay at the time. In July this year, new regulations were introduced, and lithium was classified as a separate mineral; the associated grade must reach 0.4% for mining. After retesting, Jianxiawo's grade did not meet the standard, requiring an additional 177 million mining rights fee and necessitating a re-application process. Now, the explosives permit, worker arrangements, and safety inspections are all stuck. It's not that they don’t want to start work; it’s that they really can’t. Yichun claims to be Asia's lithium city, but now there are no mines available for extraction. Jiangte Electric has obtained a mining license, but the safety approval has not passed. Guoxuan High-tech's production capacity is also lagging. Additionally, half of the lithium used domestically has to be imported. In South America, a 'Sovereignty Agreement' has been enacted, limiting foreign companies to a maximum of 35% shareholding. Our own lithium mica mines have average quality, high refining costs, and low efficiency. Salt lakes freeze in winter and cannot be mined, and overseas procurement is restricted. By the end of November, the national lithium carbonate inventory was only 109,000 tons, less than a quarter of the peak in 2023. Prices have surged directly, with lithium carbonate rising from 60,000 in the middle of the year to over 90,000 in December, an increase of nearly 60%. Upstream companies like Yongxing Materials and Tianqi Lithium's gross margin suddenly increased by twelve percentage points. Jiangte Electric's stock price is also rising; although the mine has not been mined, the market believes it will eventually start. Midstream companies producing cathode materials are struggling, with cost proportions rising from 45% to 58%, and they can only raise prices. Downstream battery manufacturers are experiencing polarized situations. CATL remains relatively stable because it owns mines, whereas second-tier manufacturers' orders have dropped by 15%, and production lines have started to reduce output. Car manufacturers have calculated that for every 10,000 yuan increase in lithium prices, the battery cost for a car increases by 500 yuan, meaning new car pricing will definitely need adjustments next year. The industry is searching for new ways out. There are internal reports from battery companies that the originally planned sodium-ion battery launch in mid-2026 has been moved up to the first quarter. At the same time, due to the lower lithium consumption of lithium iron phosphate routes, some car manufacturers have begun mass testing of this material. The International Energy Agency has just stated that the tight lithium resource situation will continue until 2030. China's lithium battery industry is now competing not only on production volume but also on who can control upstream resources and who can reduce dependence on lithium through technological means. Whoever locks in the mineral supply first can weather the next price increase. This mining crisis is not a coincidence. The approval process has not kept pace with market changes, and the technological routes have been forced to adjust. Small companies cannot bear the cost pressure. The real transformation lies within the power structure. CATL is not the only participant, but it is the only large enterprise capable of waiting, raising 177 million in funds, and enduring policy changes. Others can only be anxious, while it can lay out its plans calmly. On the surface, this issue is about the lack of ore, but in reality, the rules of the game are being redefined. Those with capital, patience, and technology will hold the initiative.
Asia's Lithium City Mining Crisis: CATL's Lithium Mine Resumption Falls Through, Traders Have No Ore to Sell
Lao Zhou has been in the lithium ore business in Yifeng for five years, and this winter has left him stunned. On December 5, he went to the warehouse to check and found that even the last truckload of goods was missing. Holding a price list of 400 yuan per ton, no one was willing to sell. Last year at this time, his warehouse still had 30,000 tons of ore stacked up; this year, even samples are nowhere to be found. It’s not just Lao Zhou experiencing this situation; 90% of small traders in Yichun are stuck here, and everyone wants to know where the goods went. The answer points to the same place—Jianxiawo.
That place was supposed to resume operations on December 5, but there was not a sound on site, as if no one had ever been there. The machines were not operating, and no workers were seen. It wasn't due to equipment failure but because the law changed. CATL spent over 800 million three years ago to acquire the exploration rights for this land, which was registered as ceramic clay at the time. In July this year, new regulations were introduced, and lithium was classified as a separate mineral; the associated grade must reach 0.4% for mining. After retesting, Jianxiawo's grade did not meet the standard, requiring an additional 177 million mining rights fee and necessitating a re-application process. Now, the explosives permit, worker arrangements, and safety inspections are all stuck. It's not that they don’t want to start work; it’s that they really can’t.
Yichun claims to be Asia's lithium city, but now there are no mines available for extraction. Jiangte Electric has obtained a mining license, but the safety approval has not passed. Guoxuan High-tech's production capacity is also lagging. Additionally, half of the lithium used domestically has to be imported. In South America, a 'Sovereignty Agreement' has been enacted, limiting foreign companies to a maximum of 35% shareholding. Our own lithium mica mines have average quality, high refining costs, and low efficiency. Salt lakes freeze in winter and cannot be mined, and overseas procurement is restricted. By the end of November, the national lithium carbonate inventory was only 109,000 tons, less than a quarter of the peak in 2023.
Prices have surged directly, with lithium carbonate rising from 60,000 in the middle of the year to over 90,000 in December, an increase of nearly 60%. Upstream companies like Yongxing Materials and Tianqi Lithium's gross margin suddenly increased by twelve percentage points. Jiangte Electric's stock price is also rising; although the mine has not been mined, the market believes it will eventually start. Midstream companies producing cathode materials are struggling, with cost proportions rising from 45% to 58%, and they can only raise prices. Downstream battery manufacturers are experiencing polarized situations. CATL remains relatively stable because it owns mines, whereas second-tier manufacturers' orders have dropped by 15%, and production lines have started to reduce output. Car manufacturers have calculated that for every 10,000 yuan increase in lithium prices, the battery cost for a car increases by 500 yuan, meaning new car pricing will definitely need adjustments next year.
The industry is searching for new ways out. There are internal reports from battery companies that the originally planned sodium-ion battery launch in mid-2026 has been moved up to the first quarter. At the same time, due to the lower lithium consumption of lithium iron phosphate routes, some car manufacturers have begun mass testing of this material. The International Energy Agency has just stated that the tight lithium resource situation will continue until 2030. China's lithium battery industry is now competing not only on production volume but also on who can control upstream resources and who can reduce dependence on lithium through technological means. Whoever locks in the mineral supply first can weather the next price increase.
This mining crisis is not a coincidence. The approval process has not kept pace with market changes, and the technological routes have been forced to adjust. Small companies cannot bear the cost pressure. The real transformation lies within the power structure. CATL is not the only participant, but it is the only large enterprise capable of waiting, raising 177 million in funds, and enduring policy changes. Others can only be anxious, while it can lay out its plans calmly. On the surface, this issue is about the lack of ore, but in reality, the rules of the game are being redefined. Those with capital, patience, and technology will hold the initiative.
See original
The Lithium Capital of Asia's Mining Crisis: CATL's Lithium Mine Resumption Fails, Traders Have No Ore to Sell Old Zhou has been in the lithium ore business in Yifeng for five years, and this winter he was taken aback. On December 5th, he went to the warehouse to check and found that even the last truck of goods was missing. Holding a price list of four hundred yuan per ton, he found no one willing to sell. Last year at this time, his warehouse still had thirty thousand tons of ore, but this year even samples can't be found. It's not just Old Zhou facing this situation; ninety percent of small traders in Yichun are stuck here, and everyone wants to know where the goods have gone, with all answers pointing to the same place—Jianxiawo. That place was supposed to resume operations on December 5th, but there was not a sound on site, as if no one had ever been there. The machines were not running, and no workers were seen. It wasn't a malfunction of equipment; it was due to legal changes. CATL spent over 800 million yuan three years ago to acquire the exploration rights to this land, which was registered as ceramic soil at the time. In July this year, a new regulation came out, listing lithium as a separate mineral, requiring a byproduct grade of at least 0.4% for mining. After re-testing, Jianxiawo's grade did not meet the standard, requiring an additional payment of 177 million yuan in mining rights fees, and they have to go through the process again. Currently, explosives permits, worker arrangements, and safety inspections are all stalled. It's not that they don't want to start work; it's that they genuinely can't. Yichun claims to be the Lithium Capital of Asia, but now it has no mines to exploit. Jiangte Electric has obtained a mining permit, but the safety approval has not gone through. Guoxuan High-tech's production capacity is also lagging. Moreover, half of the lithium used domestically has to be imported. South America has introduced a "Sovereignty Agreement," which allows foreign companies to hold a maximum of 35% equity. Our own lithium mica mines have average quality, high refining costs, and low efficiency. Salt lakes freeze in winter and cannot be mined. Overseas procurement is also restricted. By the end of November, the national inventory of lithium carbonate had only 109,000 tons left, less than a quarter of the peak in 2023. Prices have surged directly, with lithium carbonate rising from sixty thousand in the middle of the year to over ninety thousand in December, an increase of nearly sixty percent. Upstream companies like Yongxing Materials and Tianqi Lithium Industry saw their gross profit margins increase by twelve percentage points. Jiangte Electric's stock price is also rising; although the mine hasn't been exploited yet, the market believes it will eventually start. Midstream companies producing cathode materials are struggling. Their cost share has risen from forty-five to fifty-eight, and they can only raise prices in response. Downstream battery manufacturers are facing a polarized situation. CATL remains relatively stable because it has its own mines, while second-tier manufacturers have seen a fifteen percent drop in orders and are starting to reduce production. Automakers have calculated that for every ten thousand yuan increase in lithium prices, the cost of a vehicle's battery increases by five hundred. New car pricing will definitely need to be adjusted next year. The industry is searching for new paths. Reports have emerged from within battery companies that the originally planned sodium-ion batteries, set to launch in mid-2026, will now be advanced to the first quarter. At the same time, because lithium is used less in the lithium manganese iron phosphate route, some car manufacturers have already begun mass testing this material. The International Energy Agency has just stated that the tight situation of lithium resources will continue until 2030. China's lithium battery industry is now competing not only on output but also on who can control upstream resources and who can reduce dependence on lithium through technological means. Whoever locks down the mineral supply first will survive the next round of price increases. This mining crisis did not occur by chance; the approval processes are lagging behind market changes, and technological routes have been forcibly adjusted. Small companies cannot bear the cost pressure. The real transformation lies within the power structure. CATL is not the only participant, but it is the only large enterprise capable of waiting, pulling out 177 million yuan, and enduring policy changes. Others can only fret, while it can lay out its plans calmly. On the surface, this issue is about a lack of ore; in reality, it is about the game rules being redefined. Whoever has capital, patience, and technology will be able to seize the initiative.
The Lithium Capital of Asia's Mining Crisis: CATL's Lithium Mine Resumption Fails, Traders Have No Ore to Sell
Old Zhou has been in the lithium ore business in Yifeng for five years, and this winter he was taken aback. On December 5th, he went to the warehouse to check and found that even the last truck of goods was missing. Holding a price list of four hundred yuan per ton, he found no one willing to sell. Last year at this time, his warehouse still had thirty thousand tons of ore, but this year even samples can't be found. It's not just Old Zhou facing this situation; ninety percent of small traders in Yichun are stuck here, and everyone wants to know where the goods have gone, with all answers pointing to the same place—Jianxiawo.
That place was supposed to resume operations on December 5th, but there was not a sound on site, as if no one had ever been there. The machines were not running, and no workers were seen. It wasn't a malfunction of equipment; it was due to legal changes. CATL spent over 800 million yuan three years ago to acquire the exploration rights to this land, which was registered as ceramic soil at the time. In July this year, a new regulation came out, listing lithium as a separate mineral, requiring a byproduct grade of at least 0.4% for mining. After re-testing, Jianxiawo's grade did not meet the standard, requiring an additional payment of 177 million yuan in mining rights fees, and they have to go through the process again. Currently, explosives permits, worker arrangements, and safety inspections are all stalled. It's not that they don't want to start work; it's that they genuinely can't.
Yichun claims to be the Lithium Capital of Asia, but now it has no mines to exploit. Jiangte Electric has obtained a mining permit, but the safety approval has not gone through. Guoxuan High-tech's production capacity is also lagging. Moreover, half of the lithium used domestically has to be imported. South America has introduced a "Sovereignty Agreement," which allows foreign companies to hold a maximum of 35% equity. Our own lithium mica mines have average quality, high refining costs, and low efficiency. Salt lakes freeze in winter and cannot be mined. Overseas procurement is also restricted. By the end of November, the national inventory of lithium carbonate had only 109,000 tons left, less than a quarter of the peak in 2023.
Prices have surged directly, with lithium carbonate rising from sixty thousand in the middle of the year to over ninety thousand in December, an increase of nearly sixty percent. Upstream companies like Yongxing Materials and Tianqi Lithium Industry saw their gross profit margins increase by twelve percentage points. Jiangte Electric's stock price is also rising; although the mine hasn't been exploited yet, the market believes it will eventually start. Midstream companies producing cathode materials are struggling. Their cost share has risen from forty-five to fifty-eight, and they can only raise prices in response. Downstream battery manufacturers are facing a polarized situation. CATL remains relatively stable because it has its own mines, while second-tier manufacturers have seen a fifteen percent drop in orders and are starting to reduce production. Automakers have calculated that for every ten thousand yuan increase in lithium prices, the cost of a vehicle's battery increases by five hundred. New car pricing will definitely need to be adjusted next year.
The industry is searching for new paths. Reports have emerged from within battery companies that the originally planned sodium-ion batteries, set to launch in mid-2026, will now be advanced to the first quarter. At the same time, because lithium is used less in the lithium manganese iron phosphate route, some car manufacturers have already begun mass testing this material. The International Energy Agency has just stated that the tight situation of lithium resources will continue until 2030. China's lithium battery industry is now competing not only on output but also on who can control upstream resources and who can reduce dependence on lithium through technological means. Whoever locks down the mineral supply first will survive the next round of price increases.
This mining crisis did not occur by chance; the approval processes are lagging behind market changes, and technological routes have been forcibly adjusted. Small companies cannot bear the cost pressure. The real transformation lies within the power structure. CATL is not the only participant, but it is the only large enterprise capable of waiting, pulling out 177 million yuan, and enduring policy changes. Others can only fret, while it can lay out its plans calmly. On the surface, this issue is about a lack of ore; in reality, it is about the game rules being redefined. Whoever has capital, patience, and technology will be able to seize the initiative.
See original
Cigarettes are not selling well? The post-00 generation collectively resists + price increase hits hard, the tobacco industry is in a panic with no solution! Cigarettes, once an essential "social currency" at dinner parties, are now struggling to clear inventory! The post-00 circle treats cigarettes as "social assassins"; when someone pulls out a cigarette, others dodge faster than rabbits, covering their noses and waving their hands, making the scene awkward enough to make one want to pick their toes! Contemporary young people are all about "zero participation" in cigarettes, white liquor, and collectibles that were once favorites of middle-aged individuals! Health awareness has skyrocketed, seeing through the harms of cigarettes; they'd rather drink milk tea and chew gum than touch anything that harms their lungs. The old routine of passing cigarettes to bridge distances has completely failed among the youth, and cigarettes have transformed from "hard currency" to something to be avoided! Low-priced cigarettes are catching up with price increases! Once, affordable cigarettes at a dozen yuan were not enough to sell at retail stores. Now, with a price increase, old smokers find it not worth it, reducing their intake or even quitting smoking, and retail stores are just lying flat --- halving their stock, with low-priced cigarettes gathering dust on the shelves, and the boss exclaims, "If they don't sell, it's better not to stock them!" It's not surprising that cigarette sales are cooling down! Young people's refusal of cigarettes is a sign of progress in health awareness, not being bound by old-fashioned social norms. The price increase of low-priced cigarettes goes against consumer expectations, and everyone votes with their feet. In the consumer market, health and cost-effectiveness are king; outdated products that can't keep up with the pace will be eliminated sooner or later!
Cigarettes are not selling well? The post-00 generation collectively resists + price increase hits hard, the tobacco industry is in a panic with no solution!
Cigarettes, once an essential "social currency" at dinner parties, are now struggling to clear inventory! The post-00 circle treats cigarettes as "social assassins"; when someone pulls out a cigarette, others dodge faster than rabbits, covering their noses and waving their hands, making the scene awkward enough to make one want to pick their toes!
Contemporary young people are all about "zero participation" in cigarettes, white liquor, and collectibles that were once favorites of middle-aged individuals! Health awareness has skyrocketed, seeing through the harms of cigarettes; they'd rather drink milk tea and chew gum than touch anything that harms their lungs. The old routine of passing cigarettes to bridge distances has completely failed among the youth, and cigarettes have transformed from "hard currency" to something to be avoided!
Low-priced cigarettes are catching up with price increases! Once, affordable cigarettes at a dozen yuan were not enough to sell at retail stores. Now, with a price increase, old smokers find it not worth it, reducing their intake or even quitting smoking, and retail stores are just lying flat --- halving their stock, with low-priced cigarettes gathering dust on the shelves, and the boss exclaims, "If they don't sell, it's better not to stock them!"
It's not surprising that cigarette sales are cooling down! Young people's refusal of cigarettes is a sign of progress in health awareness, not being bound by old-fashioned social norms. The price increase of low-priced cigarettes goes against consumer expectations, and everyone votes with their feet. In the consumer market, health and cost-effectiveness are king; outdated products that can't keep up with the pace will be eliminated sooner or later!
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但凡是南亚那片儿过来的询盘,甭管印度、巴基斯坦还是孟加拉,报价单第一行永远是:100% T/T IN ADVANCE。 翻译过来就是,哥们儿,先打钱,全款。不然免谈。 总有人跟你画饼,张嘴就是“我们集团很大”“一年稳定采购八百个柜”,PPT做得比我们产品介绍都精美。 你信吗? 我反正一个字儿都不信。 这些都是我们前辈拿真金白银亏出来的血泪教训。你听他吹牛的时候,就当听相声了,乐呵乐呵得了,千万别上头。 尤其是别跟我提什么“巴铁”。 真的,生意场上,没有“铁”不“铁”的,只有“钱”不“钱”的。我遇到的巴基斯坦客户,跟印度客户在砍价、磨叽、画大饼这几件事上,简直一模一样,一个师父教出来的。 说白了,这不是什么偏见。 这就是在那个商业环境里,活下来的一种策略,一种深入骨髓的习惯。 我们也是。 想活下来,就得把丑话说在前面,把钱收到自己兜里。 这才是对订单、对工厂、对自己,最大的负责。 也是对他们最大的尊重
但凡是南亚那片儿过来的询盘,甭管印度、巴基斯坦还是孟加拉,报价单第一行永远是:100% T/T IN ADVANCE。
翻译过来就是,哥们儿,先打钱,全款。不然免谈。
总有人跟你画饼,张嘴就是“我们集团很大”“一年稳定采购八百个柜”,PPT做得比我们产品介绍都精美。
你信吗?
我反正一个字儿都不信。
这些都是我们前辈拿真金白银亏出来的血泪教训。你听他吹牛的时候,就当听相声了,乐呵乐呵得了,千万别上头。
尤其是别跟我提什么“巴铁”。
真的,生意场上,没有“铁”不“铁”的,只有“钱”不“钱”的。我遇到的巴基斯坦客户,跟印度客户在砍价、磨叽、画大饼这几件事上,简直一模一样,一个师父教出来的。
说白了,这不是什么偏见。
这就是在那个商业环境里,活下来的一种策略,一种深入骨髓的习惯。
我们也是。
想活下来,就得把丑话说在前面,把钱收到自己兜里。
这才是对订单、对工厂、对自己,最大的负责。
也是对他们最大的尊重
See original
If we say that Xu Jiayin had only one chance to turn things around, it would be when he was making Evergrande Spring. Because Evergrande Spring has no upper limit, it's normal to earn hundreds of billions in a year. The owner of Nongfu Spring, Zhong Shanshan, surpassed Jack Ma in wealth by selling water, although Hainan's Haikou Flower Island also has no upper limit, but after all, Haikou Flower Island is just a tourist attraction. In South China, I was notified to attend an order meeting for a water brand. The venue was brightly lit, with a whole row of sample waters displayed, the packaging was good, and the taste was acceptable. The person in charge patted his chest and said they wanted to make the water a new explosive product, spreading it to every street. The PPT stated nationwide coverage, media placement, and celebrity endorsements. It sounded uplifting. When the real terms came out, everyone started to look at each other. The initial order quantity was high, and the entrance fee had to be calculated separately, with display placement requiring a stack. The suggested retail price headed straight for the high-end, not in the same range as the two yuan water in community stores. The old distributor next to me whispered that at this price point, it's hard to sell in volume. The launch did indeed have a grand momentum. Advertisements were everywhere, and convenience stores changed their displays overnight. The first week's sales were good, but problems arose in the second week. Supermarkets held promotions and pulled the price down to over three yuan, while street-side small shops were still selling for over four yuan. Once the price difference appeared, parallel trading began, and someone reported low prices in various groups. County distributors occasionally held back several trucks of inventory, and cash flow became tight. The most agonizing moment was at eleven o'clock one night when the regional group notified that the guiding price would be uniformly lowered the next morning, and old price inventory would have to be digested on its own. The group was quiet at first, then exploded; some said that at this pace, old customers would run away, some asked how rebates were calculated, and some directly said they wanted to exit. The next day I went to the warehouse, and the goods were piled up like a wall, with the driver smoking at the door, saying that if he took it back, the boss would be furious. In fact, for the water category, the biggest fear is not the competitors, but consumers unwilling to spend a few yuan every day. You either tell a water source story that everyone can remember, or provide a price that people won't hesitate to pay, or leave enough profit for the channels. If you cover one of the three, you can survive; cover two, you can grow big. In our case, we wanted to cover all three, but ended up not standing firm on any. Later, the headquarters pushed out new packaging and new pricing, trying to move into high-end gift boxes while also focusing on the sinking market. Wanting both ends, the channels became more hesitant. Everyone was afraid of changing prices, afraid of pressure on inventory, afraid that there would be new policies tomorrow. The brand hadn't solidified in consumers' minds yet, and the channels' patience was exhausted first. Now, looking back, if we had stabilized prices and sales from several core cities at that time, without rushing to cast a net nationwide, giving distributors lighter tasks and clearer profit structures, even if it was slower, we might have found a second path. After all, water isn't a one-time purchase; it relies on daily repurchases. That night, the breeze at the warehouse entrance was very cool. I watched the last truck of returned water get loaded up, and my phone was still lighting up with group messages. Someone was asking if they could try again after the price drop. More people were silent. Did you buy that bottle of water back then? How much are you willing to pay for a bottle of water?
If we say that Xu Jiayin had only one chance to turn things around, it would be when he was making Evergrande Spring.
Because Evergrande Spring has no upper limit, it's normal to earn hundreds of billions in a year. The owner of Nongfu Spring, Zhong Shanshan, surpassed Jack Ma in wealth by selling water, although Hainan's Haikou Flower Island also has no upper limit, but after all, Haikou Flower Island is just a tourist attraction.
In South China, I was notified to attend an order meeting for a water brand. The venue was brightly lit, with a whole row of sample waters displayed, the packaging was good, and the taste was acceptable. The person in charge patted his chest and said they wanted to make the water a new explosive product, spreading it to every street. The PPT stated nationwide coverage, media placement, and celebrity endorsements. It sounded uplifting.
When the real terms came out, everyone started to look at each other. The initial order quantity was high, and the entrance fee had to be calculated separately, with display placement requiring a stack. The suggested retail price headed straight for the high-end, not in the same range as the two yuan water in community stores. The old distributor next to me whispered that at this price point, it's hard to sell in volume.
The launch did indeed have a grand momentum. Advertisements were everywhere, and convenience stores changed their displays overnight. The first week's sales were good, but problems arose in the second week. Supermarkets held promotions and pulled the price down to over three yuan, while street-side small shops were still selling for over four yuan. Once the price difference appeared, parallel trading began, and someone reported low prices in various groups. County distributors occasionally held back several trucks of inventory, and cash flow became tight.
The most agonizing moment was at eleven o'clock one night when the regional group notified that the guiding price would be uniformly lowered the next morning, and old price inventory would have to be digested on its own. The group was quiet at first, then exploded; some said that at this pace, old customers would run away, some asked how rebates were calculated, and some directly said they wanted to exit. The next day I went to the warehouse, and the goods were piled up like a wall, with the driver smoking at the door, saying that if he took it back, the boss would be furious.
In fact, for the water category, the biggest fear is not the competitors, but consumers unwilling to spend a few yuan every day. You either tell a water source story that everyone can remember, or provide a price that people won't hesitate to pay, or leave enough profit for the channels. If you cover one of the three, you can survive; cover two, you can grow big. In our case, we wanted to cover all three, but ended up not standing firm on any.
Later, the headquarters pushed out new packaging and new pricing, trying to move into high-end gift boxes while also focusing on the sinking market. Wanting both ends, the channels became more hesitant. Everyone was afraid of changing prices, afraid of pressure on inventory, afraid that there would be new policies tomorrow. The brand hadn't solidified in consumers' minds yet, and the channels' patience was exhausted first.
Now, looking back, if we had stabilized prices and sales from several core cities at that time, without rushing to cast a net nationwide, giving distributors lighter tasks and clearer profit structures, even if it was slower, we might have found a second path. After all, water isn't a one-time purchase; it relies on daily repurchases.
That night, the breeze at the warehouse entrance was very cool. I watched the last truck of returned water get loaded up, and my phone was still lighting up with group messages. Someone was asking if they could try again after the price drop. More people were silent. Did you buy that bottle of water back then? How much are you willing to pay for a bottle of water?
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【美国家安全战略报告提出“西半球优先”,美防长称门罗主义“比以往任何时候都更加强大”】特朗普政府发布国安战略,美国国防部长宣布“门罗主义”现已“生效”,且“比以往任何时候都更加强大”,暗示可能在西半球增加部队、基地和军事行动,并调整美军全球部署以应对该地区的紧张局势
【美国家安全战略报告提出“西半球优先”,美防长称门罗主义“比以往任何时候都更加强大”】特朗普政府发布国安战略,美国国防部长宣布“门罗主义”现已“生效”,且“比以往任何时候都更加强大”,暗示可能在西半球增加部队、基地和军事行动,并调整美军全球部署以应对该地区的紧张局势
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I just heard a foreign diplomat say privately: Macron's visit to China, his biggest regret is that he didn't stay for at least three days. At last night's celebration banquet, a counselor who followed the entire process drunkenly shook his head, saying: "The president smiled wryly at the students at Sichuan University, saying, 'The only regret of this trip is that time is always too short.' His exact words were - 'I have always hoped to have a richer and more comprehensive understanding of your country, but a truly fulfilling journey often leaves one with a sense of unfinished business and limited sights, eagerly anticipating a return.'" The detail is that he specifically chose Chengdu, his first visit to Sichuan, just to squeeze out a morning to walk and talk with Chinese leaders in Dujiangyan, rush to the university in the afternoon to communicate with young people, and in the evening, he had to rush to accompany table tennis athletes for practice; even his wife acted separately, heading straight to the giant panda base to see the one that returned from France, named 'Dream Fulfillment.' This itinerary was so packed that even the local reception team sighed: 'He seems to be afraid of missing a second.' Now, when I think about how even the president is desperately grabbing time during his visit, afraid of missing out, I feel that our usual complaints about having a full schedule are simply unfounded grievances. Do you have any real experiences around you of wishing to split a day into two?
I just heard a foreign diplomat say privately: Macron's visit to China, his biggest regret is that he didn't stay for at least three days.
At last night's celebration banquet, a counselor who followed the entire process drunkenly shook his head, saying: "The president smiled wryly at the students at Sichuan University, saying, 'The only regret of this trip is that time is always too short.'
His exact words were - 'I have always hoped to have a richer and more comprehensive understanding of your country, but a truly fulfilling journey often leaves one with a sense of unfinished business and limited sights, eagerly anticipating a return.'"
The detail is that he specifically chose Chengdu, his first visit to Sichuan, just to squeeze out a morning to walk and talk with Chinese leaders in Dujiangyan, rush to the university in the afternoon to communicate with young people, and in the evening, he had to rush to accompany table tennis athletes for practice; even his wife acted separately, heading straight to the giant panda base to see the one that returned from France, named 'Dream Fulfillment.'
This itinerary was so packed that even the local reception team sighed: 'He seems to be afraid of missing a second.'
Now, when I think about how even the president is desperately grabbing time during his visit, afraid of missing out, I feel that our usual complaints about having a full schedule are simply unfounded grievances.
Do you have any real experiences around you of wishing to split a day into two?
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Finally understood where thousands and tens of thousands of viewers in the live broadcast room come from, it turns out many are bought traffic! Buying traffic has two ways: the first is to buy from the official, for example, by scrolling through Douyin, you can always see ads that guide traffic to live broadcasts, this is one way. The second is to buy traffic from third parties, that is, a room filled with thousands of mobile phones, is a business that specializes in boosting popularity for live broadcasts. So when a broadcast starts and there are tens of thousands of people online, it is very likely that the traffic was bought from a third party. A friend of mine who does beauty live streaming fell into this trap last month. When she was just starting out, her live broadcast room had at most ten viewers, and no one even asked about the color testing products. Hearing someone in the group say that buying traffic could 'break the deadlock', she gritted her teeth and spent three thousand yuan to buy 'targeted traffic' from the official, but the people who came in either exited immediately or asked irrelevant questions, like 'Can you send the link to this outfit, streamer?', and she only sold three items in a session. Not willing to give up, she found a third party, who confidently said, 'For five hundred yuan, I can get you to ten thousand online.' She hesitated but transferred the money, and an hour before the broadcast, the other party sent a screenshot saying, 'All devices are up and running.' Sure enough, three minutes into the broadcast, the online number jumped to nine thousand seven, and she was so excited her voice was shaking, quickly starting to introduce new products. But after forty minutes, besides a few repeated 'Keep it up, streamer' comments, no one even asked for prices, and not even her own lucky bags were grabbed—those 'viewers' were simply non-interactive zombie accounts. Even worse, a week later, the platform sent her a violation notice, saying she 'used non-officially recognized traffic methods', directly restricting her live broadcast recommendations. She went to confront the third party, but they had already blacklisted her. Later, after asking a friend who works in operations, she learned that the traffic from third parties was all made up of accounts registered in bulk using emulators or second-hand phones, and when the platform checked the IP addresses, they were all from the same place—no wonder they got banned. I've heard of even crazier things: a small streamer bought traffic to deceive suppliers. When the suppliers saw twenty thousand online in the live room, they immediately signed an exclusive supply contract, but the first live broadcast only sold fifty items, and the suppliers came looking for compensation, but the streamer had already run off with the money. There are also some newcomers who were tricked by training institutions, saying 'buying traffic is the way to start', spending tens of thousands to buy a bunch of dead followers, and in the end, their accounts were all wasted. Now my friend has completely given up on buying traffic, spending two hours a day studying products and chatting with old fans, slowly accumulating over a thousand active followers, and last month, she sold over thirty thousand in one broadcast. She said, 'Those fake viewers look lively, but having ten real fans is much more useful.' In fact, no matter what you do, being eager for quick success is useless; the popularity bubble in the live broadcast room bursts as soon as it's poked, only real quality can keep people. Have you ever encountered a live broadcast room that buys traffic? Let’s discuss it in the comments.
Finally understood where thousands and tens of thousands of viewers in the live broadcast room come from, it turns out many are bought traffic! Buying traffic has two ways: the first is to buy from the official, for example, by scrolling through Douyin, you can always see ads that guide traffic to live broadcasts, this is one way. The second is to buy traffic from third parties, that is, a room filled with thousands of mobile phones, is a business that specializes in boosting popularity for live broadcasts. So when a broadcast starts and there are tens of thousands of people online, it is very likely that the traffic was bought from a third party. A friend of mine who does beauty live streaming fell into this trap last month. When she was just starting out, her live broadcast room had at most ten viewers, and no one even asked about the color testing products. Hearing someone in the group say that buying traffic could 'break the deadlock', she gritted her teeth and spent three thousand yuan to buy 'targeted traffic' from the official, but the people who came in either exited immediately or asked irrelevant questions, like 'Can you send the link to this outfit, streamer?', and she only sold three items in a session. Not willing to give up, she found a third party, who confidently said, 'For five hundred yuan, I can get you to ten thousand online.' She hesitated but transferred the money, and an hour before the broadcast, the other party sent a screenshot saying, 'All devices are up and running.' Sure enough, three minutes into the broadcast, the online number jumped to nine thousand seven, and she was so excited her voice was shaking, quickly starting to introduce new products. But after forty minutes, besides a few repeated 'Keep it up, streamer' comments, no one even asked for prices, and not even her own lucky bags were grabbed—those 'viewers' were simply non-interactive zombie accounts. Even worse, a week later, the platform sent her a violation notice, saying she 'used non-officially recognized traffic methods', directly restricting her live broadcast recommendations. She went to confront the third party, but they had already blacklisted her. Later, after asking a friend who works in operations, she learned that the traffic from third parties was all made up of accounts registered in bulk using emulators or second-hand phones, and when the platform checked the IP addresses, they were all from the same place—no wonder they got banned. I've heard of even crazier things: a small streamer bought traffic to deceive suppliers. When the suppliers saw twenty thousand online in the live room, they immediately signed an exclusive supply contract, but the first live broadcast only sold fifty items, and the suppliers came looking for compensation, but the streamer had already run off with the money. There are also some newcomers who were tricked by training institutions, saying 'buying traffic is the way to start', spending tens of thousands to buy a bunch of dead followers, and in the end, their accounts were all wasted. Now my friend has completely given up on buying traffic, spending two hours a day studying products and chatting with old fans, slowly accumulating over a thousand active followers, and last month, she sold over thirty thousand in one broadcast. She said, 'Those fake viewers look lively, but having ten real fans is much more useful.' In fact, no matter what you do, being eager for quick success is useless; the popularity bubble in the live broadcast room bursts as soon as it's poked, only real quality can keep people. Have you ever encountered a live broadcast room that buys traffic? Let’s discuss it in the comments.
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