Recently, Bloomberg's chief U.S. economist Anna Wong has been emphasizing the same point: The number of rate cuts in 2026 will be significantly higher than the market's current general expectations.
Moreover, this viewpoint is not just her personal 'opinion,' but has already been officially written into Bloomberg's terminals and media interpretations, representing an institutional level judgment.
But the problem is that most institutions in the market, including mainstream interpretations of the dot plot, believe that there is a high probability of just one rate cut in 2026. The judgments given by the committee members are also consistent with this direction.
With the same Federal Reserve and the same year, why is there such a large divergence?
In fact, the answer is very simple: the dot plot reflects 'what should happen', while the real votes reflect 'what will happen'.
These two matters are fundamentally different.
The dot plot represents the median opinion of 19 individuals; the actual votes come from 12 individuals.
The dot plot discusses 'where the interest rate target should be'; the voting discusses 'whether to cut rates this time'.
The dot plot is based on data from the end of 2025; reality will be updated continuously with data from 2026.
Therefore, it is normal for there to be deviations between the dot plot and the final number of rate cuts, and it does not require excessive interpretation.
——Some people believe that there should only be one rate cut in 2026, but they think that the timing of the cut within the year is not synchronized;
——Some people feel that there should be three rate cuts, but knowing that everyone disagrees, they have to vote in favor at every meeting;
——Some people rely entirely on data; if the model triggers, they cut rates, and if it doesn't trigger, they hold steady.
This is the difference determined by the system itself.
However, Bloomberg's perspective is not based on the dot plot, but is completely the opposite:
First, forecast the CPI and unemployment rate for 2026, and then backtrack to determine how many rate cuts the Federal Reserve needs to make to align with policy goals under these economic conditions.
Anna Wong's key judgment is:
After February 2026, inflation will show a noticeable decline.
Before explaining this judgment, first compare two sets of real data:
Second half of 2025:
Unemployment rate: July 4.2%, August 4.3%, September 4.4%, October missing.
CPI: July 2.7%, August 2.9%, September 3.0%, October missing.
Trend: rising unemployment rate, rising CPI → 'weakening employment + unstable inflation'
Then compare with the second half of 2019:
The unemployment rate has remained stable below 4% for a long time.
CPI has been below the corresponding target range of 2.5% for a long time.
The reason for the rate cut in 2019 was because 'inflation was too low', not because 'there were problems with employment'.
In contrast, in 2025: employment is weakening, inflation is unstable, and key data is missing, leading to a rapid increase in disagreement among committee members.
But the important thing is:
If the unemployment rate continues to rise in 2026, while CPI falls back to below 2.5%, then even the most hawkish committee members will have to accept a rate cut.
This is not an attitude, but a decision made by the Federal Reserve's responsibilities.
This corresponds exactly to Anna Wong's core viewpoint:
The forward-looking inflation indicators she focuses on all point to the same conclusion—
After February next year, CPI may experience a noticeable decline. If the unemployment rate is still around 4.4% at that time, the number of rate cuts will increase significantly, rather than just 'one' as indicated in the dot plot.