Quantum computers do not currently pose a threat to Bitcoin, according to Jameson Lopp, co-founder of crypto storage company Casa and developer.

This comment comes as the discussion increases over whether advancements in quantum computing are reaching a level where the cryptographic security of blockchains like Bitcoin and Ethereum could be at risk.

Experts divided on when quantum computers could threaten Bitcoin

In a recent post on X (formerly Twitter), Lopp stated that quantum computers will not break Bitcoin for the time being.

“No, quantum computers will not break Bitcoin in the near future. We will continue to monitor their development... We hope for the best, but must prepare for the worst,” wrote Lopp.

Lopp’s estimate aligns with what many experts think: quantum computers are not currently a direct threat to the network. Adam Back, CEO of Blockstream, also recently said that the risks in the short term are 'negligible'.

“This is only an issue for decades, it is extremely early now and there are still enormous challenges in every area of the necessary applied physics to see if it is even possible on a usable scale. But it is good to be 'quantum ready',” said Back.

Charles Hoskinson, founder of Cardano, thinks the same. According to him, the risk of quantum computers on blockchain is overestimated and it is not urgent now. Hoskinson also indicated that blockchains can switch to quantum-resistant cryptography, but this will be significantly less efficient.

Yet there are experts who believe that time is starting to run out. David Carvalho, CEO of Naoris Protocol, warns that quantum computers could undermine the security of Bitcoin within 2 to 3 years.

Michele Mosca, a researcher at the University of Waterloo, also predicted that there is a 1 in 7 chance that fundamental public-key cryptography could be cracked as early as 2026.

On Metaculus, the expected timeline for when quantum computers can decipher one of the RSA numbers has also been shortened. That estimate went down from 2052 to 2034.

The Quantum Doomsday Clock project looks even more worrying. According to their calculation, a quantum computer will crack Bitcoin’s encryption on March 8, 2028.

Why it is difficult to make Bitcoin quantum-proof

Although experts do not agree on the timeline, they often agree on one point. If quantum-resistant adjustments are ever needed, they will take time. Lopp estimates that the migration to post-quantum standards could take 5 to 10 years.

When asked why the discussion about quantum computer risks usually focuses on Bitcoin and not on traditional banks, Lopp pointed to the difference in how quickly systems can be adapted.

“Because they can upgrade their systems much faster than the Bitcoin ecosystem,” he explained.

Meanwhile, another market observer explained why transitioning blockchain networks to quantum-resistant cryptography is more complicated than in central systems.

“For banks and the internet, transitioning is relatively simple. If cryptographic standards change, they can implement new algorithms through coordinated updates, revoke old keys, issue new access codes, and even force users to migrate,” he said.

Bitcoin, on the other hand, has no central party that can enforce such changes. A broad social consensus, technical coordination, and voluntary participation from users are required to transition to post-quantum signatures.

The analyst pointed out that lost, abandoned, or inactive Bitcoins and wallets cannot be migrated. As a result, a portion of the supply will always remain vulnerable once quantum attacks are possible. Technical limitations make it even more complicated.

“Most post-quantum signature schemes have much larger keys and signatures than ECDSA. In a system already limited by block sizes and global storage, this is not a small adjustment. What may be a small extra effort for a bank server or web connection becomes a significant scalability problem at the consensus level in a blockchain,” the report stated.

So, the same decentralization that makes Bitcoin safe and resilient also means that cryptographic adjustments are slower, more complex, and harder to implement than in centralized systems.