小猪天上飞-Piglet

On December 9, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) in the United States issued explanatory letter 1188 confirming that national banks have the authority to engage in cryptocurrency transactions as a core banking business with risk-free principal. This seemingly technical clarification document is, in fact, a mild but lethal erosion initiated by the Trump administration's pro-crypto policy from TradFi against DeFi. When banks are allowed to act as matching principals, buying from one client and selling to another without holding inventory risk, they are essentially replicating the intermediary function of decentralized exchanges but with the KYC/AML compliance framework and centralized control of traditional finance. This represents a dimensionality reduction strike against DeFi protocols that tout anti-censorship and permissionless features, rather than healthy competition. The market's immediate reaction appears positive, with BTC rebounding from $90,618 to $92,723, up 2.3%, and ETH rising from $3,125 to $3,322, up 6.2%. The AI sector tokens led with a 4.46% increase. However, this surge reflects more of an expectation of short-term liquidity improvement rather than a long-term value reassessment. Once banks deeply engage in cryptocurrency trading intermediaries, they will gradually erode the market share of decentralized protocols using their capital advantages and customer base. The trading volume of DEXs like Uniswap and Curve may face systemic diversion from bank retail channels in the future. A more nuanced observation is that the OCC emphasizes that banks must operate 'safely and soundly' and comply with 'applicable laws,' which means that banking cryptocurrency operations will be subject to much stricter regulatory scrutiny than DeFi protocols. This asymmetric regulatory environment may become a lever for traditional banks to lobby for tighter DeFi regulations, demanding that DEXs and lending protocols implement equivalent compliance costs in the name of 'fair competition,' thus stifling the efficiency advantages of the latter. While cryptocurrency analysts and regulatory observers on social media generally view this guidance positively, believing it has built a bridge for TradFi-crypto integration, few question who sets the toll for this bridge and whether decentralized protocols will be reduced to objects of absorption or elimination in this integration. On-chain data shows that ETH saw a net inflow of 73,919 coins on December 9, seemingly confirming institutional optimism, but this may only be a pre-reserve behavior of the banking system before entry rather than true retail FOMO. Technically, ETH's 4-hour RSI reached 67.7, close to overbought, while the daily RSI of 57.8 indicates upward momentum, but the price remains below the 50-day moving average of $3,330, suggesting that the rebound may be a bear market rally rather than a trend reversal. Open interest surged by 8.37% to $41.2 billion, and Binance's funding rate of 0.00576% indicates that bulls are paying for high leverage; such a high-fee environment often precedes sharp corrections. The deeper contradiction is that while the OCC's explanatory letter nominally claims 'no inventory risk,' banks as intermediaries effectively control the routing, pricing, and timing of trade flows. They can sell order flow to high-frequency traders (PFOF model) or engage in legitimate front-running using information advantages. The transparency of DeFi and public competition for MEV will lose advantage in the face of banking black-box operations. Once banks establish retail entry points for cryptocurrency trading, their influence over regulators will be used to push for 'consumer protection' legislation, which in reality builds a moat for themselves against non-bank entities. Critics warn that systemic risks are not alarmist, as the high volatility of crypto assets, once transmitted through bank balance sheets into the traditional financial system, could trigger a chain reaction similar to the 2008 subprime mortgage crisis. At that time, the knee-jerk response of regulators would inevitably be to tighten rather than relax crypto policies. Therefore, the OCC's explanatory letter, on the surface a policy tailwind, is in fact a Trojan horse for integrating the cryptocurrency market into the traditional financial system. Its long-term effect may not be a rise in coin prices but rather the suffocation of DeFi innovation and the comprehensive dominance of centralized institutions over the market. The outcome of this covert war is likely to be a highly compliant, institutionally controlled, innovation-stifled, yet superficially prosperous pseudo-crypto market.

There is a question that has never been publicly discussed, but I think it is particularly crucial: someone in the founding team of @APRO Oracle has previously worked in the blockchain department at JPMorgan. This background stands out in an industry full of 'DeFi purists.'
There is a hierarchy of disdain in the crypto circle: DeFi veterans look down on CeFi workers, and on-chain natives look down on the 'traitors' coming from TradFi (traditional finance). However, I believe that this 'dual identity' is precisely APRO's greatest advantage—it understands the rules of the crypto world while also knowing the ins and outs of Wall Street. This 'bilingual ability' is the key to the success of RWA (real-world asset tokenization).

Have you ever thought about a question: why is @APRO Oracle working so hard to expand onto so many chains? Over 40 chains sounds impressive, but when you take a closer look, the mainstream ones like Ethereum, BNB Chain, Solana, Arbitrum, and Base are already covered. Honestly, how many of the lesser-known chains have daily active users exceeding 10,000? How many have a TVL over 100 million USD?
At first, I also thought APRO was just playing a numbers game—after all, the crypto space is full of projects that claim "I support 100 chains" and are just PPT projects. But after digging deeper, I found that APRO's cross-chain layout is not just for show; it’s part of a much larger strategy, and the core of this strategy can be summed up in four words: data sovereignty.

Lorenzo's official website proudly lists a long string of supported blockchains — Mantle, Taiko, Manta, BNB Chain, BEVM, Mode, Corn, Hemi, Botanix, Arbitrum, Aptos, Swell, Sui, Ethereum, Berachain, Bitlayer, B², Scroll, Movement Labs, X Layer, Merlin, counting more than 20 in total.
This list looks impressive, giving the impression of Lorenzo being "everywhere." But if you really check the data on these chains, you will discover a harsh reality: Lorenzo's $600 million TVL is almost entirely concentrated on 3 chains, while the remaining 17 chains together might not even reach $10 million.

I have never had high hopes for this thing called the test network. In the cryptocurrency world over the years, how many projects have boasted about test networks with 'millions of daily active users' and 'billions of calls', only to reveal their true nature once they hit the mainnet—either turning out to be empty bots or fake data, discovering that the SDK is half-broken within a month, making it feel like stepping on a landmine. But last week, having nothing to do, I downloaded the KITE Ozone test network SDK and decided to give it a try myself. As a result, I couldn't stop once I started; I ran AI calls over a hundred times, simulating various scenarios, from simple data scraping to complex multi-agent collaboration, taking a full four days. The more I tried, the more I felt something was off—this test network wasn't just 'showing off its muscles,' but quietly accumulating real demands. Let me start with my first failed test to see what secrets the KITE Ozone test network is hiding and why it might become the 'low-key king' in the AI agent economy.

Have you ever thought that in the future what we hold in our wallets will not be USD, nor BTC, but a GPU's 'future income rights'? It sounds like science fiction, but reality is already happening. On October 31st, @GAIB AI officially launched their AI synthetic dollar AID and staking certificate sAID on the mainnet. This is completely unlike an ordinary DeFi project launch; it feels more like the symphony of AI + RWA + blockchain is officially starting. GAIB's goal is to enable ordinary people to directly participate in the economy of AI and robotic infrastructure, rather than just being bystanders, which is really cool but also very dangerous.

In November 2025, South Korea's largest exchange Upbit was attacked by a hot wallet on the Solana chain, resulting in the theft of $36 million (44.5 billion KRW). Stolen assets included tokens such as SOL, BONK, JUP, RAY, PYTH, RNDR, USDC, and ORCA. Security company Halborn analyzed that the attackers exploited a flaw in the digital signature infrastructure to derive private keys from the on-chain history for withdrawals. The attack occurred on the same day that Upbit's parent company Dunamu was acquired and coincided with the sixth anniversary of the exchange's previous theft. This "ritualized" timing, along with the technical sophistication of the methods used, made the North Korean Lazarus Group the primary suspect. The deeper significance of this attack far exceeds the surface economic losses; it marks that state-level APT organizations have targeted cryptocurrency exchanges as long-term monetization objectives and have developed systematic attack capabilities. Although Upbit responded quickly by freezing deposits and withdrawals and announced on December 10 that 99% of user assets would be transferred to cold wallets—exceeding 80% of regulatory minimum standards—this post-event remedy does not erase the structural vulnerabilities of centralized exchanges when facing state-sponsored hackers. The market's reaction was relatively restrained; although BTC fell to $86,000 on December 2, this was more due to market adjustment rather than a single event. Localized impacts were mainly reflected in the short-term pressure on KRW trading pairs and a surge in trading volume. On-chain data showed that Solana's TVL had decreased from $11.3 billion to $9.1 billion in the period leading up to the attack (November 1-26), while after the attack on November 27, it slightly increased by 2% to $9.2 billion and then stabilized at $9 billion, indicating that the overall ecosystem's resilience remains. However, the net outflow of USDC on Solana reached -$294 million on November 27, possibly reflecting a panic withdrawal of some funds. A more nuanced perspective is that this attack exposed systematic flaws in the hot wallet signature architecture, as even leading exchanges have failed to achieve physical isolation of the signature process and zero-knowledge of key materials. Although Upbit's subsequent transfer of 99% of assets to cold storage enhances safety margins, it also implies a decrease in liquidity response speed and sacrifices user experience. This dilemma of balancing security and convenience becomes particularly acute in the face of state-sponsored hackers, as organizations like the Lazarus Group have resources and patience that far exceed ordinary hackers; they can linger in target systems for extended periods waiting for the optimal attack window. Furthermore, of the $175 million stolen in DeFi in November, Upbit accounted for 21%, indicating that centralized exchanges remain high-value targets for attacks. While social media and news outlets have pointed out the possibility of North Korean hackers and emphasized the need to improve key management models, few have discussed how to price the geopolitical risks posed by state-level attackers or whether the crypto industry should establish insurance or mutual aid mechanisms for such "force majeure" events. Upbit's promise to fully compensate users preserved its reputation, but the long-term impact of the $36 million loss on its financial health remains uncertain, and whether this "exchange-backed" model can be sustained depends on whether the frequency and scale of attacks remain within manageable limits. If future losses reach hundreds of millions or even billions of dollars, even the largest exchanges may face insolvency crises. Technically, SOL's price has remained relatively stable post-breach at $137, with a 4-hour RSI of 58.9 indicating mild bullishness, but a daily RSI of 48.7 remains neutral, and the price is below the 50-day moving average of $145, suggesting limited upward momentum. Although open interest increased by 2.41% to $7.3 billion, the positive funding rates (Binance 0.001858%, Bybit 0.01%) indicate that long positions are becoming riskier at high levels. The overall declining OBV reflects distribution pressure, suggesting institutions may be using the rebound to offload assets. A deeper concern is that the Upbit incident has reinforced regulators' arguments for "more stringent regulation of centralized custodianship," which could catalyze an increase in exchange licensing and capital requirements both in South Korea and globally. Smaller exchanges may be eliminated under compliance cost pressures, further increasing market concentration while reducing competition and raising user costs. The ongoing existence of state-sponsored hackers makes "self-custody" the only absolutely safe choice, but the insufficient key management capabilities of retail investors mean that many users will suffer losses or choose to exit the market during this transition. Therefore, the Upbit theft is not just a security incident; it is a stress test for the crypto industry under the triple challenges of geopolitical issues, centralized risks, and user security education. The answer to this test may not be fully resolvable through technological advancement, as long as value is stored on connected devices and managed by centralized entities, there will always be a potential for breaches by state-level adversaries. The existence of this structural risk fundamentally jeopardizes the long-term stable growth of the crypto market unless the industry can find a new balance between decentralization, user experience, and regulatory compliance; otherwise, similar incidents will recur cyclically, continuously eroding market confidence and capital stock.

Bro, I've been navigating the cryptocurrency space for several years now, and after various projects hype up and eventually fade away like a bad party, I occasionally come across some projects that catch my eye, making me think, 'Alright, this isn’t just another pump-and-dump scheme — it really has the potential to change the game.' That's the feeling I have about APRO Oracle right now. @APRO_Oracle hasn’t been hyped; it’s like a quiet fortress, building itself while others are busy throwing confetti. And it does so with

There is an old saying in the crypto circle: to determine whether a project is reliable, first look at its token economics. How much does the team take? How much do VCs take? How much can retail investors get? Is the unlocking schedule a ticking time bomb? Behind these questions lies the true intentions and long-term plans of the project team.
When I first analyzed the token economics of @APRO-Oracle, I was a bit confused when I saw that allocation table—1 billion AT total supply, with only 230 million in circulation, and the remaining 770 million locked. The team gets 10%, investors 20%, ecosystem 25%, staking rewards 20%, and each part has its own unlocking schedule, with some needing to wait for a 1-year cliff and others for 2 years. With such a complex design, what exactly is going on?